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Introduction
Most of the differences between the U.S. and Latin American legal systems are
rooted in dissimilar cultural and societal approaches. One important area is that of equity.
In fact, whereas in Latin America equity plays a relegated subsidiary role, in the United
States equity permeates legal institutions — both in the criminal and civil arenas — in
almost all areas, including evidence, remedies, precautionary measures, trials, juries,
sentencing, and trusts. In fact, trust law is one of the most important fields where key
differences between Anglo-American common law and Latin American civil law take
place because of the subdued role of equity in one and its vitality in the other.
Due to its flexibility, the trust is considered one of the most useful legal tools for
promoting business in the United States. In Latin America, in contrast, the trust
(fideicomiso) is used only in limited circumstances in the commercial and financial
realms and has been described as a rigid and outdated institution.
As a consequence, any attempts at merely transplanting the Anglo-American idea
of trusts into Latin America would be likely doomed to fail. This argument does not deny
the prospects for transforming the Latin American fideicomiso into a modern and
effective legal tool. In fact, the need to improve the Latin American fideicomiso was
outlined in a study commissioned in 1921 by the U.S. Congress, which concluded that
one of the reasons for the inefficiency of Latin American banking systems was “the lack
of the trust.”1
A redesign of the Latin American fideicomiso into a more Anglo-American-type
of business trust would help boost investment promoting growth and development in the
region. The search for the modernization of the Latin American trust needs to avoid the
extremes of introducing cosmetic changes alone or upsetting the very foundations of
Latin American civil law systems. Nor should this undertaking meet defeatism based on
the enormous task of updating an outdated institution.
In this context, this article reviews the essential aspects of trusts in both legal
systems, identifies their key differences, highlights the benefits brought about by AngloAmerican business trusts, studies the aspects of the Latin American fideicomiso that
challenge the expansion of trade and business and, finally, advances general criteria and
examples for further study of legal reforms in the region that lean towards mimicking the
multifarious tool that the Anglo-American trust represents.
Part I identifies the main elements of the Latin American fideicomiso and the
Anglo-American Inter Vivos trust. This section acknowledges the contractual nature of the
former and the more flexible nature of the latter. A review of the origin and definition of
the Anglo-American inter vivos trust is included to understanding its benefits. In explaining
the advantages of this trust, part I focuses on the divided concept of ownership, the notion
of the entrusting, the segregation of assets principle, tracing, and tax treatment.
1

Maurizio Lupoi, Trusts. A Comparative Study. (CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW, 2000), at 269.
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Part II seeks the points of convergence and divergence between the AngloAmerican trust and the Latin American fideicomiso. This section stresses that the trust
lies at the heart of the Anglo-American legal system because it is based upon thoughts,
processes, cultural approaches, priorities, and conceptions concerning the organization of
societal and individual life distinctive to Anglo-American societies. Latin American legal
systems, in contrast, rest on a significantly different mode of legal thought and analysis,
characterized by the formality of civil law. Ten specific areas of comparison are
incorporated, including the powers of grantors, courts, the publicity requirement for
trusts, and their termination.
Part III deals with the quest for equivalence between both trust versions, explores
the comparisons that have been attempted in the past, and arrives at the conclusion that it is
not possible to find an absolute simile to the Anglo-American business trust in Latin
America. Despite this assertion, the article recognizes the value of striving to discover
points of convergence, exemplified by governmentally-created trusts. Furthermore, this
section specifies particular kinds of business and commercial trusts in common law and
matches them, as applicable, with their Latin American counterparts. This section proposes
that, though meritorious, the Latin American experiences with business and commercial
trusts are limited in reach and scope, and need to be deepened to foster business and
investments in the region.
Part IV looks at what lies ahead in furthering trust development in the Latin
American region. It analyzes the attempts developed hitherto, especially in the form of
the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition. It sets
forth several trust alternatives available in Anglo-American law that are unknown in
Latin America. It further lies out basic criteria for the reformulation of the Latin
American fideicomiso.
The conclusion confirms the need to reformulate the Latin American fideicomiso
and updating it for the increasing challenges that globalization has created in the region.
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PART I. GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND THE ANGLOAMERICAN INTER VIVOS TRUST
1. The Latin American Fideicomiso
1.1. In General
The Latin American trust is called fideicomiso. The Roman law institutions of the
fiducia and fideicommissum have been identified as the remote predecessor of the
fideicomiso. Fiducia2 was understood as an agreement under which the transferee must
return the full ownership of the property to the transferor.3 The Napoleonic Civil Code –
which is an offspring of the French Revolution and the inspiration to most Latin
American civil codes –4 abolished the fiducia, but maintained the fideicommissum,5
which became ultimately the predecessor of the Latin American fideicomiso.
Among the most unmerciful characterizations the Latin American fideicomiso has
received from the Anglo-American world are that it is “a fossil, inelastic, inflexible
institution with no scope of action, utterly useless for the varied and complex civil
relations of modern life.”6 It has also been said that Latin America possesses
“complicated trusts laws that [make it] difficult to fashion transactions.”7
On the other way around, civil lawyers generally voice their view that the
common law trust is but a “jumble of ideas,”8 and wonder “[h]ow can the civilian
effectively design that equivalent if there is uncertainty where the common law trust idea
is to be found on the spectrum?”9

2

Carly Howard, Trust Funds in Common Law and Civil Law Systems: A Comparative Analysis, 13 U.
Miami Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 343 (2006), at 8 ("The fiducia originally concerned the transfer of property to
a creditor or manager by a formal act of sale, yet with an agreement that the creditor would reconvey the
property upon payment of a debt." Also noting that, "the primary difference between the common law trust
and the fiducia is that a trust beneficiary has a legal right to property in the trust, while a fiducia beneficiary
is, in essence, no more than a mere creditor. The manager of the fiducia property held complete legal and
equitable title in the property. Another discrepancy is that a trust may be revocable if established properly
as a revocable trust, while a fiducia may not be revoked. Still, many civil law countries […] offer a
contemporary variation of the fiducia as a trust substitute.").
3
Donovan Waters QC, The Future of the Trust from a Worldwide Perspective, in THE INTERNATIONAL
TRUST, (John Glasson, ed., 2002), at 619.
4
See generally M.C. Mirow, The Power of Codification in Latin America: Simón Bolívar and the Code
Napoleón, 8 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 83, 1-29 (2000). See also M.C. Mirow, Borrowing Private Law in
Latin America: Andres Bello's Use of the Code Napoleon in Drafting the Chilean Civil Code, 61 La. L.
Rev. 291, 1-38 (2001).
5
Waters, supra note 3, at 619.
6
See Albert S. Golbert & Yenny Nun, Chapter V: Trusts and Future Interests, in LATIN AMERICAN LAWS
AND INSTITUTIONS, (1982), at 90.
7
Georgette Chapman Poindexter, et al., En Ruta Hacia el Desarrollo: The Emerging Secondary Market in
Latin America, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 257, 4 (2002), at 10.
8
Waters, supra note 3, at 639.
9
Id.
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Therefore, so far it has broadly been held on both sides of the aisle that there is no
possible equivalent between the Anglo-American trust and the fideicomiso.10 Even the
relevance of finding a common ground has been hotly disputed.11 Whereas in common
law countries the trust “for hundreds of years […] has played a vital role in organizing
transactions of both a personal and a commercial character,” in civil law countries “the
private trust does not exist as a general form.”12
This inauspicious environment provides the context for an in depth analysis of
the Latin American fideicomiso.
1.2. The Quintessential Latin American Inter Vivos Trust is Always Contractual
It is broadly believed in Latin American civil law that a contractual form provides
more certainty.13 This explains the preference for a contractual trust instead of the
unilateral approach to trust creation found in common law.14 Panama15 – a country that
introduced trusts long before most other Latin American countries16 –defined the
fideicomiso in 1941 as “an irrevocable agency whereby determined property is
transferred to a person called the fiduciario, for this person to dispose of them according
to the instructions of the fideicomitente, for the benefit of a third party, called
fideicomisario.”17 This definition lies out the main elements of the fideicomiso
commonly found in most Latin American jurisdictions. For example, Peru’s banking law
of 1993 defines fideicomiso as

10

Lupoi, supra note 1, at 195-6 (“[T]o speak of a trustee as one would of a (civilian) fiduciary is a serious
error.”).
11
Henry Hansmann, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73
N.Y.U.L. REV. 434, 2 (1998), at 10 (“Contract law in the civil law countries is also generous in permitting
enforcement of a contract by a third party beneficiary, with the consequence that in those jurisdictions, too,
the importation of trust law doctrine would add nothing significant to the law in this regard.”).
12
Id., at 1.
13
Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, at 37 (“An enforceable
contract represents the most common substitute for trust. Contract law can compensate for a lack of trust
because parties do not need to rely as heavily on trust that another party will keep her promise if a court
will enforce the promise either by awarding damages or requiring court-monitored specific performance.
When commercial players have access to information and legal sanctions in case of breach, ‘commercial
transactions can succeed even in the presence of some distrust.’”).
14
Paul Matthews, The New Trust: Obligations without Rights, in TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW,
30 (A. J. Oakley, ed., 1996), at 1 (“Had the right [the beneficiary’s] remained purely personal, it might have
developed into a law of obligations rather like the civil law of contract, i.e. voluntarily assumed
obligations…”).
15
This country enjoys the privilege of being called the home to a trust scholar who has been called "the
father of the Latin American legislation on trust." See Roberto Goldschmidt, The Trust in the Countries of
Latin America, 3 Inter-Am. L. Rev. 29, 31 (1961) or 3 Rev. Jur. U.I. 29 (1961), quoted in Kathryn
Venturatos Lorio, Louisiana Trusts: The Experience of a Civil Law Jurisdiction With the Trust, 42 LA. L.
REV. 1721 (1982), at 3, n. 38.
16
See R. J. Alfaro, The Trust and the Civil Law with Special Reference to Panama, in 33 J. Comp. L.
(1951) III 25, quoted in Lupoi, supra note 1, n. 12, at 269.
17
Law 17 of 1941, published in the Gaceta Oficial on March 6, 1941, art. 1. (translation by author). See
also the Regulations of the Law issued by Executive Decree 16, published on October 18, 1984, amended
by Executive Decree 53 published on December 31, 1985.
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a legal relationship through which a person called fideicomitente, transfers
property to another person, called fiduciario, for the formation of a
fiduciary patrimony, subject to the fiduciary ownership of the fiduciario
and subject to the achieving of a specific purpose or purposes for the
benefit of a third person or of the fideicomitente himself, called
fideicomisarios.18
Thus typical inter vivos Latin American fideicomisos work as follows: the grantor
creates the trust, primarily for the benefit of the fiduciario and then for the fideicomisario
or fideicomisarios. The fiduciario holds title, possession and use of the trust’s assets on
his own right, both legal and equitable. The rights of third parties, namely, the
fideicomisario(s), do not limit the fiduciario. This means that the only limitation affecting
the fiduciario is that he has to transfer the trust corpus to other fideicomisario(s) upon the
occurrence of a condition19 and then “return the property when the purpose is fulfilled
[the condition met], either to the original transferor or to a third party nominated by
him."20 Statutorily, the condition is deemed failed if it does not occur within certain
period of time from the creation of the fideicomiso.21 The grantor may appoint a plurality
of fiduciarios or fideicomisarios.22 But while the first fideicomiso is pending, the
fideicomisario does not have any rights over the trust corpus: she will only receive what
is left according to the use or disposition the fiduciario has made in compliance with the
grantor’s instructions. In other words, if the grantor authorized the fiduciario to execute
acts of disposition over the property, the fiduciario will get “that what is left at the time
of the transfer, if any.”23
At first sight, both the Latin American fiduciario and fideicomisario could be
considered as a certain type of beneficiaries in Anglo-American legal jargon, as they
enjoy full ownership and possessory rights over the trust corpus. They key difference lies
in that the fiduciario is under the obligation to transfer the assets to the fideicomisario
once a condition occurs. Unlike the Anglo-American trustee, the fiduciario does not hold
the property for another, namely, the beneficiary. In that sense, and more clearly, neither
the fiduciario, nor the fideicomisario – who takes what is left after the fiduciario’s rights
expire– are beneficiaries in Anglo-American terms.
Another important distinguishing characteristic of the fideicomiso is that – as a
reaction against the Old Regime – the Napoleonic Civil Code eliminated the possibility
of constituting two or more successive fideicomisos. The purpose of this prohibition –
which was incorporated by most Latin American civil codes in the nineteenth century –
was to avoid the perpetuation of property ownership within the family in violation of
18

The Regulation of the Trust and Fiduciary Service Companies of 1999 was approved by Resolution SBS
No. 1010-99 of November 11, 1999, issued by the Superintendence of Banks and Insurance Companies,
and published in El Peruano on November 13, 1999, art. 2. (translation by author).
19
CÓD. CIV. art. 773 (Chile 2005) (“Fiduciary ownership is that which is subject to the burden of passing
to another person in the event that a condition occurs.”) (translation by author).
20
Venturatos, supra note 16, at 2.
21
See CÓD. CIV. art. 739 (Chile 2006).
22
Id. art. 742.
23
Id. art. 760.
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succession rules. Therefore, the grantor cannot create a fideicomiso forcing the fiduciario
to transfer the corpus to a fideicomisario providing that the latter, in turn, transfers the
corpus to a second fideicomisario – or back to the fiduciario when a condition occurs. A
violation of this prohibition renders the transfer from the first to the second
fideicomisario or back to the grantor void. In these hypotheses, trust assets remain the
property of the noncompliant transferor.24 The civil law fiduciario holds trust property
“for his own benefit,”25 and the fideicomisario (or fideicomisarios) have “no vested rights
but merely an untransferable expectancy, a contingent interest.”26 In definitive, the
central concept of holding the trust assets for the benefit of another, as it happens with the
beneficiary in the Anglo-American express inter vivos trust, is absent in the Latin
American fideicomiso.27
2. The Anglo-American Inter Vivos Trust
American families have used trusts as a device to achieve many different
objectives: sometimes as a tool for the preservation of family assets, and chiefly for the
protection of mentally and physically incompetent persons.28 In the business realm, trusts
have been commonly used to raise capital for commercial transactions, to channel
investment for financial ventures, and for other related uses.29
The broad recognition of trusts as a multifarious and flexible tool for the
organization and distribution of wealth has run parallel to a profound distrust for this
device in the eyes of some Anglo-American scholars. Some have expressed doubts that
the trust could ever achieve a completely legitimate role in American legal culture.30
Nevertheless, whatever the philosophical approach, experience shows that trusts are “one
of the most flexible Anglo-American legal devices in that it can play a part in almost any
sphere of life.”31
There is not a single or a unanimously accepted definition for the AngloAmerican trust. Undoubtedly, the notion of trust finds its etymologic origin in the
24

Id. art. 739.
Golbert, supra note 6, at 88.
26
Id..
27
Id.
28
See Paul Finn, A Comment, in TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW, 212 (A. J. Oakley, ed., 1996)
(“In equity the predominant thrust has been to prevent the exploitation or manipulation of a person in a
position of vulnerability.”).
29
See Ignacio Arroyo, Trust and the Civil Law, 42 LA. L. REV. 1709, 3 (1982) (Citing among the multiple
uses of the trust “the protection and care of incompetents, to the distribution of an inheritance or the
preservation of a family estate, to the giving of security for the transfer of immovable property, or the
issuing of bonds; to the structure of profit-sharing plans for workers, not to mention the many commercial
and financial uses such as investment trusts, guaranteed trusts and life insurance, voting trusts, trusts for
underwriting purposes, and, finally, the international trusteeship.“); see also Waters, supra note 3, at 606
(Other trust uses include “[I]nvestment, security provision, lending, and property title holding.”).
30
Id., at 3 (“[A]ccording to historical investigations, it can be proved today, without any risk of error, that
the trust was born of an illegal purpose: the transfer of lands to bogus intermediaries, avoiding in that way
the payment of taxes and the enforcement of the laws governing mortmain.”).
31
Frans Sonneveldt et al., The Trust – An Introduction, in THE TRUST. BRIDGE OR ABYSS BETWEEN
COMMON AND CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS? 3 (Frans Sonneveldt et al. ed., 1992), at 7.
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concept of confidence,32 which most communities consider a fundamental element of
societal life — and this idea deeply permeates the Anglo-American trust. Only a few
experts have attempted to provide a unique stand-alone definition of trusts.33
2.1. The Search for a Definition of the Anglo-American Trust
Much debate has taken place as to what lies at the core of the Anglo-American
trust. Some commentators have stated that it is to be found in the “duty of confidence
imposed upon a trustee in respect of particular property and positively enforceable in a
Court of Equity by a person.”34 For others, the core of the trust is found in the
“beneficiaries’ rights to enforce the trust and make the trustees account for their conduct
with the correlative duties of the trustees to the beneficiaries.”35 The determination of the
main elements of the trust provides the elements for a workable definition. Among the
many in existence, one of the most traditional and accepted definitions36 conceptualizes a
trust as
an equitable obligation, binding a person (who is called a trustee) to deal
with property over which he has control (which is called the trust
property), for the benefit of persons (who are called beneficiaries or
cestuis que trust), of whom he may himself be one, and any one of whom
may enforce the obligation.37
This definition is valid only for inter vivos contractual trusts, which are but a
small portion of the trusts available in today’s Anglo-American legal world. Among its
shortcomings, it does not recognize that trusts may be created irrespective of and even
against the settlor’s desires and that beneficiaries might not necessarily be “born” persons
but also unborn fetuses38 or even buildings or pets. Moreover, it overlooks the fact that
trusts may also benefit causes, ideas, or movements — as in the case of trusts created for
the promotion of literacy or religion. Thus arises the difficulty of finding a

32

Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531, 535 (1995), quoted in Leslie, supra
note 13, at 8.
33
Emmanuel Gaillard, et al., Trusts in Non-Trust Countries: Conflict of Laws and the Hague Convention
on Trusts, 35 AM. J. COMP. LAW 307 (1987). (“[T]rusts experts often have great aversion to giving a precise
definition of the ‘trust.’”).
34
For a review of the duty of loyalty, see John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty:
Sole Interest or Best Interest? 114 YALE L.J. 929 (2005).
35
David Hayton, The Irreducible Core Content of Trusteeship, in TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW,
47, 148 (A. J. Oakley, ed., 1996) (“[i]t is the beneficiaries’ right to enforce the trust that is at the core of the
trust.)” (David Hayton, ed., at 148).
36
Sir Arthur Underhill’s, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, 11th ed., at 3, quoted in Martyn Frost, Overview
of Trusts in England and Wales, in TRUSTS IN PRIME JURISDICTIONS, 13 (Alon Kaplan, ed., 2000).
37
Id., at 13. See also Lupoi, supra note 1, at 95 et seq. See also Underhill & Hayton, LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES (Butterworths, 15th ed, 1995), quoted in Waters, supra note 3, at 604.
38
Exceptionally in Latin America, Panama’s Law 17 of 1941 contains a groundbreaking provision allowing
the naming of the unborn as beneficiary.
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comprehensive and broadly accepted definition of the Anglo-American trust, even among
Anglo-American attorneys who are most familiar with this institution.39
2.2. A Look at the Origin of the Trust to Understanding its Current Status
The trust is as much of an institution in English culture as is soccer and tea
parties. In fact, the influence of the British trust was felt everywhere throughout the
former British Empire.40 The trust’s origins can be traced back to the middle Ages and
are intimately connected with the religious and historical events of that age. As early as
the thirteen-century Catholic monks used trusts for the implementation of their vows of
poverty.41 Trusts served in those cases as a basic means of property holding in the name
of a titleholder –usually a community—for the benefit of another, in this case the monks,
who were not allowed to own anything besides minimal personal items.42 Trusts also
served as a means of landholding for Crusaders while they went on their missions.43
During later times, trusts developed in England as a useful tool for devising real
property and for the organization and distribution of familial wealth – both inter vivos
and causa mortis — in accordance with the succession priorities of the age, which mainly
were primogeniture laws.44 With the growth of commerce and the rise of a wealthy
merchant class in England, utilization of trusts greatly increased until late in the
nineteenth century.45 At the turn of the twentieth century, the use of trusts multiplied
39

The trust has been extolled as the ‘most distinctive achievement of English lawyers.’” F.W. Maitland,
Equity also the Forms of Action at Common Law 23 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1984), quoted in
Joseph A. Rosenberg, Supplemental Needs Trusts for People with Disabilities: The Development of a
Private Trust in the Public Interest, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 91, 6 (2000), at 4.
40
See Waters supra note 3, at 625 (“Wherever the British went, the trust went with them.”).
41
See Gaillard supra note 33, at 315 (“The history of the trust, from its very beginning was a device used
by the Franciscan monks to enable them to observe the letter of their vows of poverty.”); see also Lupoi,
supra note 1, at 185 “[A]s we know, the friars could not own anything, and, according to the strictest
interpretation, could not own any right, on pain of violating their vow to poverty.”).
42
See Sonneveldt et al., supra note 31, at 3. (“It all began with the Franciscan friars who came to England
in the second quarter of the thirteen century. They were bound by their oath of poverty not to possess any
wealth. Still they needed land to live and work on. A solution was readily found. Lands were conveyed to
the borough community ad opus fratrum, to the use of the friars.”)
43
See Matthews, supra note 14. (“Trusts came into existence because lawyers were asked to create
structures to serve particular purposes: holding land whilst the owner went off to the Crusades, devising
land when there was no power of testation, avoiding feudal incidents of tenure.”).
44
Henry Christensen et al., Foreign Trusts and Alternative Vehicles, American Law Institute – American
Bar Association Continuing Legal Education, SK024 ALI-ABA 115, 1 (2004). (“At the beginning, then,
the trusts were used for dividing estates in real estate, and facilitating the donor’s testamentary plans in the
face of the laws of primogeniture and other restrictions imposed by the Crown on transfers of land, which
constituted most of the wealth of medieval society. John Langbein suggests that well into the 19th Century,
trusts by and large were still used in England as instrument of conveyancing and that only in the last 150
years do we find developing the widespread use of trusts to manage family fortunes consisting of assets
other than land.”)
45
See Waters supra note 3, at 600 (“[A]n unprecedented growth of mercantile wealth in the Victorian
period and of a prosperous urban middle class had also occurred, and the successful merchants’ trusts
reflected much of the rural landed families’ settlements.”). During this period, trusts were used “for the
holding and disposition of individual wealth within the family, both real estate and securities, cash, jewelry
and art, furniture and other assets of value.” Id. at 605.
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exponentially in the corporate arena and came to include “trusts of corporate supplied
assets to secure the company’s debenture holders, public subscription unit investment
trusts […] and the management of urban businesses by trustees following the death of the
unincorporated successful entrepreneur.”46 By the last quarter of the twentieth century, a
massive body of case law on trusts already existed in England.47
The debut of trusts in American law can be traced to the use of equity by English
courts.48 There is record of the use of trusts in the original American colonies. For
example, in the seventeenth century, a trust was used to avoid unwanted professional
liability consequences and, in another situation, to provide for the needs of a spouse and
children.49 Trusts became popular in the United States only after World War II.50
In today’s American society, trusts have seen their uses expanded to almost every
aspect of the economy, in both private and public realms. In the private sector, trusts “are
used as estate planning devices to minimize estate taxes, as perpetuators of dynastic
wealth, and as a way to preserve assets against the improvidence of a beneficiary and his
creditors.”51 By far the most important role of trusts in the United States is witnessed in
the field of capital markets.52 This widespread use is due primarily to the tax advantages
that trusts provide for settlors and beneficiaries. The trust device also grants beneficiaries
immunity against their creditors and the possibility of an alternative management by
professional trustees.53 In the public arena, on the other hand, trusts have found a unique

46

Id.; see also George L. Gretton, Trusts without Equity, in THE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
QUARTERLY, Vol. 49, 378 (2000).
47
Waters, supra note 3, at 600 (“Only in the late 1960s and the 1970s did a changed world of equity and
trust begin to emerge, and only in part did this slow revival of interest in equity come to be reflected in the
traditional case-law of trusts.”).
48
Edward C. Halbach, The Uses and Purposes of Trusts in the United States, in MODERN INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENTS IN TRUST LAW, 124 (David Hayton, ed., 1999) (“The origin of American trust law can be
traced to practices involving what was called a ‘use’ in feudal England, and then to more modern law that
evolved in the English courts of equity (or ‘chancery’).”).
49
See Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 6. (“A physician in Maryland created a trust for his wife and children to
avoid liability for potential damages in a lawsuit. In a less formal arrangement, a woman in Massachusetts
entered into a verbal trust-like arrangement with her future husband to provide for her children and prevent
her husband from controlling her property.”).
50
Roger W. Andersen, Understanding Trusts and Estates (2003), at 81, quoted in Howard, supra note 2, n.
42.
51
Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 7.
52
Id., at 7 (Currently, “[t]he largest growth of the trust –in America– has been in the area of commercial
trusts [which] constitute a significant portion of personal and national wealth.”); see also Hansmann, supra
note 11, at 2. (“[A]sset securitization trusts are now the issuers of a large fraction of all outstanding
American debt securities –more than $2 trillion worth.”). Such is the case mutual funds and pension funds,
which currently hold “roughly forty percent of all United States equity securities and thirty percent of
corporate and foreign bonds.”
53
Hansmann, supra note 11, at 18. (“Immunity from the creditors of the fund's manager is also a critical
reason for use of the trust form for mutual funds. If a fund's manager were simply the agent of the fund's
investors, the fund's portfolio would always be at risk of the fund manager's insolvency—a risk that the
investors would have great difficulty monitoring or controlling. For this reason, mutual funds that are not
formed as trusts are typically formed as business corporations.” Id., at 19 (“For this purpose, an essential
feature of the trust is that it is ‘bankruptcy remote’.”).
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role, especially in the form of charitable trusts, which have been considered a “positive
force in American culture.”54
2.3. Essential Elements
The original Anglo-American trust took the form of the express, contractual inter
vivos trust. Over the centuries, the many benefits provided by this legal institution gave
way to other forms of trusts, some of which have retained little resemblance to the
original trust form. Thus, it becomes necessary to provide an examination of the principal
elements of the express inter vivos Anglo-American trust.
2.3.1. The Divided Concept of Ownership
Much debate has taken place as to what are the essential elements of a trust. In
common law, the voluntary expression of the settlor’s will – essential in all contracts – is
definitely not a fundamental element when it comes to the creation of a trust. In fact, for
centuries and based on equitable principles, Anglo-American courts have imposed trusts
upon individuals. Not even the trustee’s express acceptance is a requirement for the
establishment of an Anglo-American trust. Thus, it can never be said that a contract lies
at the essence of the Anglo-American trust.55 Nevertheless, trusts are on many occasions
born as contractual institutions, but in the case of a so-called “contractual” trust, the key
elements required for its existence – the settlor or grantor, a trustee, and a beneficiary –
do not always converge at the moment of the trust’s creation. Even if these elements are
present, they do not always exist in singular numbers. Moreover, these three categories
can and are often intertwined and mixed: namely, the same person can simultaneously be
the settlor, the trustee, and the beneficiary of a trust. Alternatively, a person can
simultaneously be both the trustee and the beneficiary of a trust. Trusts in which the
beneficiary or beneficiaries are not specifically determined at the creation of a trust can
still subsist and be valid.
2.3.2. The Trustee
In the view of many trust law scholars, the institution of the trustee lies at the
center of the inter vivos Anglo-American trust.56 Even when the settlor and the
beneficiaries are not present, if there is a trustee, a trust may still exist. The rules
generally applicable to common law trustees are: (a) a plurality of trustees is commonly
permitted;57 (b) there are some limitations on the performance of trust obligations by the
trustee;58 (c) there are not many restrictions concerning who can be a trustee, as both
54

Id., at 7.
Common Law Trusts in Civil Law Courts, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1030 (1954), at 2 ("… at common law a trust
need not be founded upon a contract.").
56
Lupoi, supra note 1, at 179 (“The trustee is the only essential person in a trust.”)
57
Underhill, supra note 36, at 3. Id., at 16 (“[T]here is in general no limit to the number of trustees for a
trust.”).
58
English law even allows for the appointment of a protector. A protector is defined as someone whose
consent is necessary before the trustee can take any actions, or who has veto power over the trustee’s
decisions, or who has the power to change the law governing the trust, or to even remove the trustee. David
55
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natural and juridical persons may act as such;59 (d) the trustee’s role is not generally
delegable unless otherwise expressly provided in the trust instrument;60 (e) strict liability
is usually the rule when it comes to the trustee’s statutory liability;61 (f) exoneration or
indemnification clauses favoring trustees for negligent acts or omissions are generally
considered valid “except in cases of the trustee’s own fraud.”62
2.3.3. The entrusting
Together with the existence of a trustee, the most important element in a trust is
the entrusting.63 The entrusting consists of the vesting of a right or interest in the trustee
and the total dispossession of the grantor, who becomes the former owner of the trust’s
assets.64 This idea also is present in Latin America. For example, the Argentinean
fideicomiso builds upon the idea of entrusting.65 The same can be said of the Mexican
trust version, which is defined as the entrusting of an asset to the trustee who holds it for
the beneficiary’s profit.66
2.3.4. The segregation of assets principle
This rule prohibits the commingling of the trust’s assets with the trustee’s
personal assets. The trustee has legal title and not equitable interests over the trust corpus,
which resides in the beneficiary’s. The trustee is forbidden from disposing of trust assets

Hayton, Exploiting the Inherent Flexibility of Trusts, in MODERN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN
TRUST LAW, 321 (David Hayton, ed., 1999).
59
Some restrictions may apply based on residence or citizenship requirements, but these are isolated cases
in the Anglo-American world. See Frost, supra note 36, at 16 (Noting that in England, for example,
“[T]here is no bar to a non-resident acting as a trustee.”).
60
See Lupoi, supra note 1, at 228 (“The obligations must be discharged personally; the delegation of a
trustee powers is generally not accepted.”).
61
Id., at 177 (“[T]he Statute of Limitations never operates in favour of a trustee when he has acted
fraudulently or has appropriated a trust asset.”). Id. at 178 (If there are two or more trustees, “their
responsibility to the beneficiaries is joint and several,” and their defenses are extremely scant).
62
Whether the settlor should be allowed to anticipatorily waive a trustee’s negligence at the moment of the
trust’s creation is much debated, but there seems to be a consensus that a limitation should exist and that
this limitation is the trustee’s fraud or extreme carelessness. Frost, supra note 36, at 22. See also Hayton,
supra note 35, at 59. (noting that, “[T]here seems no reason in principle why a settlor should not have
freedom to exempt his trustees from liability from losses flowing from negligence, covering ordinary and
gross negligence, but not extending to losses flowing from recklessness.”).
63
See Lupoi, supra note 1, at 197 (“[W]ithout entrusting there is no trust.”).
64
Id., at 196.
65
Jorge R. Hayzus, FIDEICOMISO, (Ed. Astrea, Argentina, 2004), at 44, quoting art. 1 of Law 24,441 (“[A]
trust shall exist when a person [settlor] conveys the fiduciary ownership of particular assets to another
[trustee] who commits to act as owner for the benefit of whomever is designated in the contract
[beneficiary] and to transmit the property upon the expiration of a given term or the fulfillment of a
condition, to the settlor, to the beneficiary or to the residual beneficiary.”) (translation by Hayzus).
66
Francisco Corrales, The Real Property Trust in Mexico, in NATIONAL LAW CENTER FOR INTERAMERICAN FREE TRADE, 3 (2000), at 1 (According to Mexican law, “a trust is a mechanism through which
the Maker transfers ownership over property or rights over to a Trustee, who pursuant to instructions from
the Maker, administers the property for the Beneficiary until the fulfillment of a stated objective, by
agreement or by law.”).
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as though they were his personal property. The trustee has only legal and equitable
ownership rights over his personal assets, not over the trust’s assets
The primary purpose of the segregation or separation of assets principle is the
protection of the trust corpus from third parties, especially creditors of both the trustee
and the beneficiary. Trust assets remain isolated even after the trustee’s death.67
Similar rules occur in Latin America. For instance, the segregation of trust assets
also is a principle of Uruguayan trust law.68
2.3.5. Tracing
This is a direct consequence of the violation of the segregation principle. In fact, it
operates when “the trustee has mixed trust assets with personal assets and it therefore
becomes necessary to return to the appropriate condition of separation.”69 The trustee
breaches his duties when he transfers the assets to himself or to a third party who knows
about the conflict of interest. Sometimes the third party or the trustee himself may have
used the profits from the transfer to make investments or to purchase other assets or
values. Tracing thus serves as a procedural equitable tool aimed at determining the
whereabouts of the proceeds obtained by the transfer of property acquired in violation of
the rights of third parties.70 After the proceedings from the unlawful transfer have been
identified, the beneficiary can go after and recover the money or values that the trustee
has acquired from the commingling of his personal assets and the trust corpus.71
2.4. Characteristics and Benefits of the Trust
The flexibility in the administration of Anglo-American trusts is a key reason for
their popularity in the Anglo-American world. Other features of the trust illustrate this
point:
2.4.1. The trust is not a corporate entity
Trusts do not have a corporate structure or issue shares or other securities or
distribute dividends. Occasionally, they may perform some of these functions depending
on the type of trust and the jurisdiction involved, but that function does not transform the
67

As a consequence, the assets do not become a part of the trustee’s estate. See COD. CIV. art. 1261
(Quebec 2005). (“The fiduciary patrimony […] constitutes an autonomous and distinctive patrimony of
affectation.”) (translation by author), quoted in Lupoi, supra note 1, at 308. It would be extremely difficult
for the pursuance of business and legal acts in general to imagine the existence of trusts without the
segregation rule. In that hypothetical situation, the trustee “would need to insert explicit language in each of
her contracts insulating her personal assets from creditors' claims—a costly burden that would presumably
be impractical in many circumstances.” Hansmann, supra note 11, at 14.
68
Law 17,703 of 2003, published in the Diario Oficial of Uruguay on November 4, 2003, art. 7, paragraph
3.
69
Hansmann, supra note 11, at 60.
70
Id., at 59.
71
Id. at 60.
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trust into a corporation. One of the very benefits stemming from their nature is that trusts
can be “created and managed less formally and less expensively than companies.”72
Therefore, the fact that trusts are a separate legal entity does not transform them in a
corporation.

Comment [c1]: Stemming or judging?

2.4.2. The trust is not an agency
Unlike an agency – where the agent acts on behalf of and under the directives of
the principal, and all of the acts legitimately carried out by the agent are acts of the
principal – in the trust, the trustee – who is in charge of administering the assets – is
neither the agent of the trustor, the trust, or the beneficiary. Put simply, the trustee is “his
own man.” The reason is that, once created, the grantor relinquishes all of his rights over
the corpus and retains no rights, except the right to revoke the trust in revocable trusts,
over the trust. Moreover, the grantor does not even have the power to terminate the
trustee, and it is ultimately up to the courts to enforce the trust’s terms.73
2.4.3. The powers of courts with respect to trusts
In general, Anglo-American courts have multiple powers with respect to trusts:
they may vary their terms, appoint and remove trustees, change the trustees’ investment
powers, generically interpret and enforce the trust’s terms, decide whether there has been
a breach of the trust, and award damages.74
2.4.4. Tax benefits
Trusts have long been used as devices for tax avoidance.75 By transferring part of
his assets to a trust, the grantor decreases the amount of his taxable income, generating a
lower tax base. An extreme case of trust utilization is the “bare trust,” where “the trustee
is not faced with a group of successive beneficiaries, or when the trustee is not called
upon to carry out any activity other than maintaining ownership of the asset or
performing merely administrative tasks.”76 Bare trusts are usually created in a foreign
jurisdiction and protected by double-taxation treaties.77 In the words of an expert, these
trusts become something “little more than a shell [...] that is, the instrument does not
contain the whole of the trust.”78 This flexibility is essential for tax purposes, so that
trustees may transfer trusts’ assets to new trusts or sub-trusts or to other existing trusts,79
by means of the so-called “pour over trust.”80
72

David Hayton, The Uses of Trusts in the Commercial Context, in MODERN INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENTS IN TRUST LAW, 158 (David Hayton, ed., 1999), at 160.
73
Id., at 151.
74
Frost, supra note 36, at 20.
75
Miguel Checa, EL TRUST ANGLOAMERICANO EN EL DERECHO ESPAÑOL, 29 (McGraw Hill, 1998), at 156.
76
Id, at 157.
77
Waters, supra note 3, at 612.
78
Id., at 609.
79
Id, at 612.
80
Edward C. Halbach, The Restatement Third of Trusts: A Look Ahead, in MODERN INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENTS IN TRUST LAW, 215 (David Hayton, ed., 1999), at 211. (Pour over trusts “involve
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In this sense, the Anglo-American trust can be used for legitimate or unlawful
purposes, such as tax evasion or fraud.81 As such, it behaves as a double-edged sword.
This potential for good or evil fully permeates the regulation of Anglo-American trusts,
especially when it comes to tax issues and the protection of third parties.
2.5. Modalities
Trusts generally adopt two variants that testify to their flexibility: discretionary
and nondiscretionary or revocable and irrevocable.
2.5.1. Discretionary and Nondiscretionary Trusts
A discretionary trust allows the trustee to “decide which member or members of a
class of beneficiaries should be entitled to the trust property.”82 The trustee’s power can
extend to deciding when the trust corpus should be distributed to the beneficiary and the
amount or proportion of the distributions, when there is a plurality of beneficiaries. When
the trust instrument83 empowers the trustee to make decisions related to the trust mainly
concerning the distribution of trust income or capital, the beneficiaries generally may not
challenge the trustee’s discretion. Some exceptions apply depending on the jurisdiction.
One example is the case of the beneficiaries of a closed class who, pursuant to their
equitable rights, may ask a court to declare an early termination of the trust in some
circumstances. Another exception is the case of fraud by the trustee in the administration
of the trust.84

attempted dispositions by settlers to add other properties at the time of death to the assets already held in
their inter vivos trusts. These additions are usually made by will.”).
81
See Gaillard supra note 33, at 315 (“[T]he trust, depending on its function and purpose in any particular
case, can either be a marvelous instrument in the evolution of law or a dangerous means of evasion or even
fraud.”).
82
J.G. Riddall, The Law of Trusts, 205 (London, 1987), quoted in Sonneveldt, supra note 31, at 11.
83
The trust instrument “can be whatever the settlor and the trustee agree as worthwhile for producing the
benefits intended by the settlor.” Hayton, supra note 72, at 158. Thus, it can take the form of a stand-alone
document, or it may be a provision of a larger instrument, or it may consist of two or more writings. In
general, the key elements to determine the validity of a trust are the finding of the true and explicit intent of
the trustor to create a trust, and the compliance with the required local formalities for the execution of the
trust instrument. No differences exist with the Latin American inter vivos fideicomiso in this aspect. More
formalities might be required, but no difference in substance exists.
84
Matthews, supra note 14, at 19.
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In nondiscretionary trusts, on the other hand, provisions established by the settlor
in the trust instrument bind the trustee. Unlike discretionary trusts, which are said to
provide substantive rights to the beneficiaries, nondiscretionary trusts confer only
“procedural equitable rights” to the beneficiaries.85
2.5.2. Revocable and Irrevocable Trusts
The grantor can set the trust as either a revocable or irrevocable trust. Tax
considerations are critical when making this decision. By means of irrevocable inter vivos
trusts, the grantor designates assets that are transferred as gifts, “primarily for tax and
asset protection advantages.”86 Experience shows that irrevocable trusts give rise to many
controversial tax issues, such as “the application of registration taxes, transfer taxes,
mortgages taxes, property taxes and income taxes, calculations of capital gains and
losses.”87
Revocable inter vivos or “living” trusts, instead, are those “where the assets are
managed by the settlor who is usually the beneficiary thus receiving income or principal
during his lifetime, and are disposed of at the settlor’s death according to her
disposition.”88 Due to the inherent risk of tax evasion posited by revocable inter vivos
trusts, there are many restrictions placed on them so they do not become “a means of
circumventing the legal system.”89 These trusts “are treated for all tax purposes as if the
trust property still belongs to the settlor, and thus do not offer tax advantages to the
settlor during her life or to her estate at death.”90
PART II. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN AND THE
LATIN AMERICAN INTER VIVOS TRUST
1. In General
The institution of the Anglo-American trust finds no exact and – according to
some authors — not even a remote equivalent in civil law systems.91 Important attempts
at finding such a match have existed. For example, as early as 1936, the Supreme Court
of Switzerland, a civil law country, decided a case where a party sought recognition of a
common law trust in that jurisdiction. The Court undertook a comparison of “trusts” with
85

Lupoi, supra note 1, at 190-1.
G. Warren Whitaker, Revocable Trusts: Fact and Fiction, in NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
JOURNAL, vol. 77 number 6, 44 (2005).
87
Ferdinando Albisinni et al., Chapter 13: Italy, in THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST, (John Glasson, ed., 2002),
at 592.
88
See Halbach, supra note 48, at 129.
89
Whitaker, supra note 86, at 45.
90
Halbach, supra note 48, at 139.
91
In spite of suggestions to the contrary the Argentinean fideicomiso can hardly be equated to the AngloAmerican inter vivos trust. See Hayzus, supra note 65, at 29 (“The Republic of Argentina is currently
characterized as a country that practices and recognized the fideicomiso (a trust-law country).”) (translation
by author).
86
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the civil law institutions of “contract, mandate, usufruct, fiducie, a donation inter vivos or
a donation mortis causa.”92 The court evidenced its frustration at not finding an exact
civil law equivalent and “denied the existence of a trust and ruled that the underlying
legal concept should be explained as a ‘contract sui generis,’”93 that is an institution of
special, undefined nature.
On the other hand, civil law experts have regarded the Anglo-American trust as
"functionally unnecessary in light of the many existing civilian mechanisms which may
be used to accomplish the same ultimate results,"94 and highlight that “the trust concept is
hard to grasp,”95 because “in civil jurisdictions there is no concept comparable to the
trust.”96 In effect, certain transfers to a beneficiary, which in the Anglo-American legal
world constitute trusts, have been equated to the “Romano-Canonical usus.”97 There is
even dispute as to where the trust (or fideicomiso) originated. As previously stated, some
civil law jurists have claimed paternity of civil law trusts or fideicomisos in Roman law,
tracing its origins to the Roman fideicommissum, the Spanish comisiones de confianza, or
the French confiance or fiducie.98 The main argument used to justify their ancestry is that
the French Civil Code of 1804 (Code Napoleon) – upon which Andrés Bello’s Civil Code
took close inspiration99 – defines fiducie, a term from which fideicomiso derives as “a
contract between the ‘constituant’, i.e. the settlor, and the ‘fiduciaire’, i.e. the trustee.”100
But this notion is utterly insufficient to fully equate the fideicomiso to the fiducie.
The idea of incorporating a civil law version of the Anglo-American trust has met
reactions ranging from initial reluctance101 to outright opposition.102 It is broadly thought
in civil law circles that a full recognition of the Anglo-American trust would mean
nothing less than an overhaul of the domestic legal system, because the trust, “like
property dispositions in general, does not exist in a vacuum but is closely tied to other
legal relationships, such as marriage, and family law, contract, and succession.”103

92

Harrie L. van Mens, The Trust and Swiss Tax Law, in THE TRUST. BRIDGE OR ABYSS BETWEEN COMMON
47-48 (Frans Sonneveldt et al. ed., 1992).
93
Aktiebolaget vs. Banque des Règlements internationaux (1936), quoted in Van Mens, Id., at 47-48.
94
Venturatos, supra note 16, at 2.
95
Sonneveldt, supra note 31, at 1.
96
Id. at 1.
97
Lupoi, supra note 1, at 185.
98
Christensen, supra note 44, at 10.
99
See supra note 4.
100
Ineke A. Koele, France: A Law Proposal Including ‘La Fiducie,’ in THE TRUST. BRIDGE OR ABYSS
BETWEEN COMMON AND CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS? 68 (Frans Sonneveldt et al. ed., 1992).
101
Jairo Mayda, “Trusts” and “Living Law” in Europe, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1041, 5 (1955), at 1 (“[W]e
deem it dangerous to incorporate […] in our law an exotic institution like the Anglo-American trust.” “We
are not faced with a minor incongruity between civil and common law, but with a basic contrariety as to
their legal approach.”).
102
See Waters, supra note 3, at 629 (“[S]ince civil law jurisdictions do not need a trust, and recognition of
the common law trust in their conflict-of-law rules has no particular attraction for most civil law
jurisdictions, there is no point in their modifying this analysis […] the civilian may think, why not simply
leave the civil law contract for the benefit of the promisee, or of a third party, as it is? Why rename it?”).
103
Gaillard supra note 33, at 329.
AND CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS?
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Thus, distrust between the two sides concerning the issue of trusts seems to be the
current paradigm. A learned trust scholar stated that, “the simple answer is that common
law scholars have not attempted a comparative study of the civil law institutions, while
civil law scholars have not attempted a comparative study of trusts.”104 In fact, early
Latin American initiatives aimed at expanding the scope of fideicomisos were thwarted
by the belief that a simple “translation” of the Anglo-American trust “was in the realm of
impossibility,”105 and that such “insertion into civil-law countries [...] would be
impossible.”106 In spite of this, it has been held that “the mere fact that trusts exist in civil
law countries should prove the point that there is no basic incompatibility with civil law
structures.”107
Perhaps the only existing point of convergence between both versions of trusts is
the underlying ethical idea of fides, the confidence or “trust” permeating them.108
2. Specific Differences
An important difference between the express inter vivos common law trust and
the Latin American fideicomiso is found in the context of the fiduciary and the
fideicomisarios. It is interesting to note that the Chilean Civil Code, for example,
regulates the fideicomiso or propiedad fudiciaria [fiduciary ownership] under a paragraph
headed Of the Limitations to Ownership. This treatment reveals that, unlike common law
countries, fiduciary ownership is not considered a separate ownership but a form of
restriction on full absolute property rights.
2.1. Contractual Nature
Nevertheless, the central difference between the Latin American inter vivos
fideicomiso and the Anglo-American trust resides in the exclusively contractual nature of
the former.109 Three consequences arise from this statement: first, it is not possible to
equate the many Anglo-American versions of trusts to the Latin American fideicomiso,
due to the exclusively contractual character of the latter; second, as non-contractual trusts
are non-existent in the Latin American civil law world, foreign common law trusts
generally are denied recognition as trusts in Latin America;110 third, any practical or
academic attempts at finding an exact equivalent between the Anglo-American trust and
the Latin American fideicomiso are doomed to fail.
104

Maurizio Lupoi, The Civil Law Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 967, 7 (1999); see also ILN
Newsletter - (2005), available at http://www.ag-internet.com/push_news_one_two/thecivillawtrust.htm
(last visited June 1, 2005), at 6.
105
Lupoi, supra note 1, at 267.
106
Id.
107
Lupoi, supra note 104, at 6.
108
See Waters supra note 3, at 618 (“Trust means simply placing confidence in and reliance upon
another.”).
109
See Checa, supra note 75. (“The trust is created through a unilateral juridical act, it does not have a
contractual nature at all.”) (translation by author).
110
“Devices like implied trusts and trusts created by will or by a decision of a judge are excluded.” Koele,
supra note 100, at 68.
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The Argentinean fideicomiso is an example of the strictly contractual nature of
Latin American trusts.111 Several effects emerge from this distinction: (a) the fiduciario
becomes the owner of the trust corpus,112 a feature opposite to the Anglo-American trust;
(b) the fideicomiso does not distinguish between “legal title” and “equitable/beneficial
ownership,”113 which is a crucial element of the Anglo-American inter vivos trust; (c)
fiduciary ownership is limited in time, that is, it has to pass to the fideicomisario within a
certain period of time from the inception of the fideicomiso,114 contrasting the AngloAmerican trust, which can be perpetual; (d) the fiduciario’s liability is limited to the
value of the trust’s assets,115 which is hardly a matter of statutory law in the AngloAmerican legal world where juries and courts, in general, enjoy broad freedom to award
damages to plaintiffs beyond purely compensatory damages; and (e) the lack of cy près
in the Argentinean fideicomiso, where the unworkability of the trust’s purpose terminates
the trust and the corpus reverts to the grantor.116
In the case of Uruguay,117 for instance, the inter vivos trust –loyal to the Latin
American tradition — also is defined as a contract.118
2.2. Lingering Powers of Grantors
Civil law systems regularly keep the trustor’s powers for the duration of the
trust.119 These rights include making sure that the trustee is complying with his fiduciary
duties, ultimately revoking the trust, or asking a court to terminate the trust.120 The
settlor’s unilateral power somehow conflicts with the alleged exclusive contractual nature
of civil law trusts. In that sense, these lingering powers of the trustee are an exception to
the contractual rule.
2.3. The Transfer
The Anglo-American distinction between legal ownership rights and equitable
rights, key to understand the common law trust, is completely foreign to Latin American
legal systems. The source of the Anglo-American distinction between equitable and legal
ownership is rooted in the notion of equity, which is an area where important differences

111

See Hayzus, supra note 65, at 133. (“The framework of the fideicomiso is typically contractual, about
which there aren’t any doubts.”) (translation by author).
112
Id. at 143. (“For the law, there is one owner alone and that is […] the fiduciary [or trustee]) (translation
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between both legal systems exist.121 While the Anglo-American trustee holds legal
ownership rights over the corpus and the beneficiary’s equitable rights, the Latin
American fiduciario holds both legal and equitable rights over the trust’s assets.122
Instead, in the Anglo-American system, the trustee has legal ownership over the property
and the beneficiary’s equitable ownership. When the trust property is transferred to the
beneficiary, a consolidation of the legal and equitable property of the trust takes place.
This arrangement is foreign to Latin civil law, where both legal and equitable rights are
consolidated in an absolute ownership right.
Practical consequences come up from this separation, with all of them established
for the gain of beneficiaries. The most important is that the common law beneficiary or
beneficiaries have a right “to prevent a misuse of the trust funds, and a right to enforce
the performance of the trust.”123 The Latin American fideicomisario, in turn, may receive
only what is left upon the termination of the fideicomiso.
Furthermore, the settlor may appoint himself as beneficiary, an alternative that
does not exist in Latin American trust law.124
2.3. The Publicity Requirement
In common law jurisdictions, trusts are not required to comply with any publicity
formalities, and in many cases publicity is strictly prohibited. This rule is the case for
shares owned by a person as a trustee, real estate held in trust, and bank accounts held in
the name of the trust or the trustee.125 The main rationale is to protect and promote “the
free circulation of assets,”126 avoiding the discouragement of potential business partners
who discover that title to property held under somebody’s name is actually owned by
another.
On the contrary, trust assets transfers are subject to strict rules requiring
registration in civil law countries. The mere act of creating a trust does not perfect it
when it deals with property subject to registration requirements for any transference.127
Generally, no such registration requirements exist in Anglo-American jurisdictions,
where trust property can be registered in the name of the beneficiaries and still be subject
to the trust. But this option is unavailable in civil law jurisdictions where, according to
121

Phanor J. Eder, Equity, in A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN AND LATIN-AMERICAN LAW,
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These rules have some exemptions. See the case of Panama’s new Trust Law of 1984 defining
fideicomiso as “a juridical act whereby a person called fideicomitente transfers property to another person
called fiduciario for this to administer or dispose of them for the benefit of a fideicomisario, who may also
be the fideicomitente.” (Law 1 of January 5, 1984 published in the Gaceta Oficial on January 10, 1984,
article 1). Furthermore, this Law expressly lifts the prohibition against the appointment of two or more
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Lupoi, supra note 1, at 173.
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Id.
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Panama’s Law 17 of 1941, arts. 20-2, states that for a fideicomiso constituted upon real estate to be
enforceable against third parties, it must be registered in the property registry under the fiduciario’s name.
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registration and publicity requisites, property must be registered under the trustee’s name
or the fiduciary's. This situation applies, for example, to fideicomisos created over real
estate where any transfer to the fidudiario(s) or fideicomisario(s) must be registered in
their name in the appropriate property registry.128
The lack of publicity requirements in common law jurisdictions has long puzzled
civil law attorneys who believe the policy breeds fraud against innocent third parties. The
common law world has responded to this objection noting that the multiplicity of
remedies available have proven sufficient to avoid such risk, as case law has shown
across the centuries.129
2.5. The Divided Concepts of Estate and Interests Applicable to Land Trusts130
The basic common law notions of estate and interests in land, which generate two
separate sets of ownership rights – legal and equitable — coexist at the center of the
Anglo-American trust.131 These notions do not find an equivalent in civil law systems,
which generates several consequences:
(a) In common law, a land trust is not an independent legal entity; in civil law it
is;
(b) In attention to their enjoyment – that is, to the rights bestowed on the trustee
and the beneficiaries — common law estate trusts may confer legal and equitable rights;
civil law fideicomisos, instead, only confer legal rights to the fiduciario;
(c) Different types of real or in rem rights are identifiable in civil law. The most
important distinction is between absolute real rights (property or ownership) and limited
real rights (lease, usufruct, fideicomiso, etcetera). This differentiation is not as rigorous in
common law jurisdictions;
(d) As a legacy of feudal law there is a flexible concept of property ownership in
common law that allows its division and fragmentation. In civil law, on the contrary, due
to its Roman law roots, the concept of ownership is unitary, absolute, and indivisible. As
a result, only the owner can fully exercise the rights of use, enjoyment, and
administration over the property;
(e) In common law, an estate is an interest in land and, as such, is the object of
ownership and possession. The word “interest” is used exclusively for an interest in land.
In civil law, instead, the object of ownership and possession of land is the piece of land
itself, the material thing;
128
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(f) In common law estates can be classified based on their duration. Namely,
estates can be: (i) finite or infinite; (ii) freehold and nonfreehold estates, according to
their certain or uncertain duration (freehold estates include fee simple, which “is the
complete estate that includes all others;”132 and estate for life, “limited to the duration of
the life of its holder or to the life of a third person (called ‘pur autre vie’ estate)”).133
Unlike common law, it is not possible to think of a civil law trust without a present
owner. In other words, all estates in a trust must be present and vested. A present interest
can only exist as vested and, whether vested or contingent, future interests are
nonexistent. Furthermore, under civil law: (i) absolute property ownership is always
perpetual; thus, it is inaccurate –or rather flatly wrong– to speak of “finite” ownership in
civil law systems; (ii) non-freehold estates in general are all types of leases and are
regulated by the law of obligations, not by the law of property; (iii) the notion of civil law
property is closer to that of fee simple absolute; and (iv) estates for life are nonexistent;
and
(g) In reference to possession, it can be classified as present and future interests in
common law estates. This fact signifies that several estates can exist simultaneously over
the same land and only the possession and enjoyment of the property is differed.
Therefore, “a trust can be constituted in favor of successive beneficiaries, and in
particular in favor of beneficiaries who do not yet exist.”134 In civil law, successive
fideicomisos are outright prohibited.135
2.6. Powers of Appointment
The trust instrument in common law may provide the involvement of a third
party,136 give instructions to the trustees, or require that a third party provide consent for
the administration of the trust’s corpus.137 This power of appointment does not exist in
Latin American law.
The role of the civil law trustee is to dutifully implement the instructions
established by the grantor in the trust instrument. The obligations of trustees are defined
differently in the Anglo-American legal system.138 In fact, in Anglo-American law, these
132
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167.
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Id. at 101. Over the centuries the Anglo-American trust was developed to allow the settlor to appoint
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See Frost, supra note 36, at 17 (Concerning investment trusts, for instance, “[I]n England besides
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obligations command the trustee to act with due diligence, to the best of his skills and
abilities, observe the utmost good faith, exercise the standard of care of a reasonable and
prudent person, and avoid conflict of interests.139 Two purely Anglo-American rules
usually govern trustees’ behavior: the rule against self-dealing and the rule of fair
dealing.140 Latin American trust laws, in contrast, generally do not spell out the trustee’s
obligations in such detail.
2.7. Tracing
There is not an exact equivalent to tracing in civil law. A close parallel could be
drawn, nevertheless, with the acción reivindicatoria or replevying action, where the
grantor would retain his condition as a substantial owner and the trustee would be nothing
more than an apparent owner or agent. Similar to protections received by beneficiaries in
tracing, these persons are protected by the acción reivindicatoria in civil law
jurisdictions.141 For instance, Panama’s trust law of 1984, which was strongly influenced
by the American trust, contains a key difference between the Panamanian trust and the
Anglo-American trust: unlike in the latter, in the former, the beneficiary only has
personal actions against the trustee, not against third parties, such as creditors.142
2.8. Intervention of Courts in Trusts
In cases of disputes about the appointment of a trustee, common law courts enjoy
equitable powers to appoint and remove a trustee.143 Latin American courts do not
intervene in the appointment of trustees. Additionally, in common law, the grantor can
create a trust explicitly by executing a trust instrument. But the settlor’s will may also be
inferred from his behavior, provided that other conditions are met. A fundamental
condition is the “evidence of a deprivation of a right or entitlement for the benefit of a
third party, or ‘for the attainment of a purpose.’”144 As Latin American courts do not have
the power to “create” trusts absent an express manifestation of intention by the “grantor,”
these types of trusts are not present in Latin America.
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Lupoi, supra note 1, at 226.
The former prohibits the trustee “from purchasing trust property from and for himself,” whereas the
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2.9. Remedies Available for the Breach of Trust Duties
Equitable remedies are available broadly to a beneficiary in cases of the trustee’s
noncompliance with trust obligations, in common law jurisdictions.145 Included among
these equitable remedies are: (a) actions compelling the trustee to perform his duties;146
(b) injunctions enjoining the trustee from committing a breach of trust; (c) specific
performance forcing the trustee to redress a breach of trust (i.e., seeking the restitution of
trust property);147 (d) the appointment of a temporary receiver;148 and (e) the removal of
the trustee and the appointment of a new trustee.149
In Latin American civil law jurisdictions, by contrast, when an illegal transfer of
trust property by the trustee occurs, only three actions usually are available: (a) an acción
revocatoria aimed at annulling the transfer and restituting the trust’s assets to the
beneficiary or beneficiaries; (b) an action for compensation based on the trustee’s unjust
enrichment;150 and (c) possibly an action for personal subrogation, comparable to the
Anglo-American subrogation and novation, that is, the substitution of one person to
another in an obligation.151
The civil law acción revocatoria is common to all cases where restitution is
sought from third parties and does not only apply where the transfer has been effectuated
in violation of a fiduciary duty.152
2.10. Termination of Trusts
Like all legal institutions, trusts fail for many reasons. With the exception of some
purpose trusts – charitable trusts being the most common form — the largest cause for
the failure of a trust is the lack of a beneficiary.153 Trusts also fall short when the trust’s
purpose contradicts public policy, such as when the trust attempts to “deceive the public
administration of the country, discourage service in the armed forces or public office,
145
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See Checa, supra note 75, at 23 (In some civil law jurisdictions this is the only remedy available: “…in
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indemnification for the damages arising from that noncompliance…”) (translation by author).
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unlawful transfer; (ii) debt prior to the unlawful transfer; (iii) debtor’s intent to defraud his creditors (intent
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restrain from marriage, or subvert morality or religion.”154
Common law charitable trusts are subject to two special regimes when it comes to
their termination. First, they are not restricted by the rule against perpetuities –155 in other
words, they can last perpetually. In Latin America, by contrast, trusts cannot last forever.
A representative example is that of Mexico,156 whose General Law of Credit Institutions
and Banking Establishments of 1926157 regulating fideicomisos, specifically bans
transfers in perpetuity and limits the duration of fideicomisos to any life in being or in
conception at the time of the grantor’s death.158 Second, charitable trusts may “survive”
when their purposes become unattainable through the application of the common law cy
près doctrine,159 which allows courts to “change or expand the purposes of a charitable
trust” as close as possible to the grantor’s objectives. This doctrine is not used in Latin
America,160 which marks an enormous difference when it comes to trusts in both systems.
However, a particularity exists when it comes to the termination of trusts in Latin
America. The Colombian Civil Code has a provision that also is applicable to trusts in
cases of failure for unattainability of purpose, which states that, in default of an express
provision, “the property shall belong to the Nation, subject to the obligation to use it for
purposes analogous to those of the institution… [and that]… [t]he Congress shall
prescribe such purposes.”161 Thus, the legislature, not the judiciary, is bestowed with the
power to determine the fate of a failed fideicomiso in Colombia.
PART III: THE SEARCH FOR A LATIN AMERICAN EQUIVALENT OF THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN BUSINESS TRUST162
1. Possible comparisons with the Latin American Fideicomiso
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Legal experts in different civil law jurisdictions have long tried to find a simile of
the Anglo-American express inter vivos trust in the civil law world. As already
mentioned, history shows efforts to find an institution akin to the Anglo-American trust
in the Roman law fideicommisum, which still “exists in Roman law countries such as
Italy and France and Spain, and in Latin American countries which trace their law to the
law of Spain, such as Chile.”163 Those efforts have included references to the notions of
“agency, deposit, contracts for the benefit of third parties,”164 and other civil law
institutions. As the analysis below demonstrates, these proposals are inherently defective,
because in the absence of an explicit inter vivos agreement, no fideicomiso may exist in
Latin America.
1.1. Real estate donations
In Latin America, gifts of real estate generally must be achieved by means of a
public deed executed before a notary public, accepted by the donee, and registered in a
land registry. Otherwise, “a gift [of real estate] is not presumed except in cases expressly
provided by the laws.”165 Real estate donations performed by means of an AngloAmerican trust require entrusting or the holding of a property in the hands of the trustee
for another, namely, the beneficiary. In Latin America, by contrast, real estate donations
are an outright gift from the donor to the donee, not subject to any conditions or
encumbrances.
1.2. Usufruct
The usufruct has been defined as “a personal, contractual civil law right over land
through which a property owner grants to another the use and enjoyment of the
property.”166 The beneficiary receives a personal right and the transferor retains his right
to receive back his property upon the termination of the usufruct. Therefore, the usufruct
“does not bind subsequent landowners and cannot last longer than the life of the
beneficiary.”167 The Anglo-American trust, on the contrary, terminates the grantor’s
ownership and bestows permanent ownership rights on the beneficiary, upon whose death
the assets become a part of his estate and are acquired by the beneficiary’s heirs, whether
the succession is testate or intestate. Herein lies the dichotomy between the usufruct and
the trust.
1.3. Commodatum or gratuitous bailment
The Commodatum or gratuitous bailment been defined as a “civil law contract
through which a landowner lends land, or rights to resources on the land, to another
person free of charge.”168 An essential element of the comodato is that the transferor [or
163
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comodante] recovers the property at the expiration of the term or the occurrence of the
condition upon which she transferred the asset. Coupled with this difference,
beneficiaries of comodato rights cannot transfer them to subsequent owners and at their
death the rights are transmitted to their heirs.169 These two significant differences make it
impossible to equate the Latin American comodato and the Anglo-American trust.
1.4. Agency and deposit contracts
The Anglo-American trust is at odds with the agency agreement and the deposit
contract in that in neither of the latter two instruments does the beneficiary ultimately
acquire ownership rights over the assets involved in the transactions.170
1.5. Use, habitation
Civil law jurisdictions recognize that two “real” or in rem rights may exist
simultaneously for the same property with possessory rights.171 These institutions, which
include the use and habitation right, “allow for the total or partial utilization or
exploitation of property belonging to someone else and, in some cases, the appropriation
or acquisition of its fruits or income [by somebody else].”172 The Anglo-American trust
differs because these institutions allow the beneficiary to administer or control the
property subject to the right of the full owner. In trusts, it is the trustee who administers
the property and the beneficiary has no right to administer the trust property before the
transference occurs.
1.6. Other institutions
Several European civil law institutions have been said to come close to the notion
of the Anglo-American trust. Among them, the “foundation, mandat, fiducie, Treuhand,
contract for the benefit of a third party, usufruct, naked ownership, fideicommissary
substitution, appointment of an heir or legatee subject to a condition (“charge”),
testamentary execution, the Dutch bewind, certification, and others.”173 Nevertheless, by
no means could these institutions be considered an equivalent to the common law trust, as
fides – the sole element common to them all –is insufficient to explain the AngloAmerican trust.
2. Government trusts: A Point of Convergence
Anglo-American regulatory compliance trusts are used to tackle problems that
affect the public at large. Examples of these trusts are nuclear decommissioning trusts,
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environmental remediation trusts, liquidation trusts, prepaid funeral trusts, foreign
insurers’ trusts, and law office trust accounts.174
On the Latin American side, the use of government trusts has greatly expanded
since the fourth quarter of the twentieth century. Colombia, for example, counts on a
fiduciary system for the administration of a special account designed to promote security
and the restoration of public order in the country.175 Mexico presents many examples of
public-interest trusts: (a) the Trust for the Establishment of the Historical Studies of the
Mexican Workers’ Movement Center created in 1973;176 (b) the Trust for Commercial
Development of 1980;177 (c) the Rural Promotion Trust of 1981;178 (d) the Trust to Grant
Loans to the Concessionaires of the Freight Transportation Public Service in the Federal
District of 1990;179 (d) the National Trust Fund for Development of Tourism of 1992;180
(e) the Mining Promotion Trust of 2001;181 (f) the Trust Fund for Quality
Cinematographic Production of 2001;182 (g) the Trust Fund of Micro Financing for Rural
Women of 2002;183 and (h) the Trust Fund for the Strengthening of Saving and Lending
Associations and Cooperatives and for the Support of their Members of 2004.184
Other Latin American examples include Guatemala’s National Trust for Peace,
appropriated with government funds in 1991;185 the Roads Trust for the improvement of
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the countries’ highways of 2000;186 and the Trust Fund for Banking Capitalization of
2002 created to provide financial support to the national banking system.187
Honduras’s Special Law on the Naturalization Chart of 1991188 appointed the
Central Bank of Honduras as a “fiduciary institution.”189 Trust funds consist of deposits
made overseas in U.S. dollars by non-Hondurans seeking to become Honduran citizens.
The trust’s fideicomisarios are the beneficiaries of the Naturalization Chart.190 Other
government-established trust examples in Honduras are the Road Maintenance Trust
Fund of 1993191 and the Social Funds Trust of 1995 that was established to finance social
development programs.192
Argentina’s public interest trusts [fideicomisos de derecho público] are
established by the state for the purposes of organizing and implementing projects that
benefit the community at large.193 Examples of this type of trusts are: (a) the Fiduciary
Fund for Federal Electricity Transportation of 1999;194 (b) the “National Development
Fund for Micro, Small and Medium-size Businesses” of 2005, whereby the state –through
the Ministry of Economy — is the trustor and the National Bank of Argentina, the
trustee, to issue Certificates of Participation drawn over the trust corpus for the benefit of
the aforementioned entities;195 (c) the Trust Fund for Provincial Development of 2003,
which assumed the debts of the provinces documented in the form of public titles,
debentures, treasury bonds, or loans;196 and (d) the Trust Fund for Household Gas
Consumption Subsidies established in Law 25,565 of 2002.197
By means of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health of 1999, Costa Rica
authorized the Ministry to execute trusts with the National Banking System for the
186
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196
See article 62 of Law 25,725, which approves the Expenditures Budget and the Resources for the
National Administration for Fiscal-Year 2003, published in the Boletín Oficial of 27 January 2003.
197
Law 25,565 was published in the Boletín Oficial of March 19, 2002.
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financing of its programs and activities.198 Additionally, Law 8147 of 2001 created the
Trust for the Agricultural Protection and Promotion of Small and Medium-size
Producers.199 The Regulation of Law 8147 specifies that the fiduciario [trustee] is the
Bank of the State, which administers the trust; the fideicomitente [creator of the trust] is
the state; the fideicomisarios [the beneficiaries] are the producers; and the financial
institutions or other public or authorized private organizations –which provide loans to
the beneficiaries – are the creditors.200
El Salvador also shows some degree of experience in the creation of governmentfunded public trusts. Consider the Trust for the Development of the Reciprocal
Guarantees System of 2001, where the fideicomitente is the Government of El Salvador,
the Multisectoral Bank of Investments is the fiduciario, and the fideicomisarios are the
micro, small, and mid-size rural and urban businesses, Guarantees Companies, and the
Government of El Salvador.201 Another example is the Responsible Artisan Fishing Trust
of 2003, established to strengthen the artisan fishing organization by encouraging
investments for sustainable and orderly fishing.202 Panama’s Trust Development Fund of
2004 is yet another case of a government trust in the region.203 Finally, Brazil’s Law
11,146 of 2005 authorized the executive branch to contribute to the maintenance of the
Trust Fund created by the Inter-Governmental Group of Twenty-Four (G-4).204
3. The Case of the Anglo-American Business Trust
The grantor may create a trust with an economic or charitable purpose in mind:
economic, when it provides financial benefit to another person or himself; charitable,
when it benefits undetermined members of a class of which the trustor is not a member.
There are various expressions of Anglo-American business trusts.
3.1. Purpose trusts

198

For example, see the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health, modified by Law No. 7927 of October 12,
1999, art. 13. See also Decree 31,198-S of May 15, 2003, published in La Gaceta on June 12, 2003, which
approves a trust contract executed between the Ministry of Health and the National Bank of Costa Rica.
199
Law 8147 of October 24, 2001 was amended by Law 8390, published in La Gaceta on November 7,
2003, and by Law 8427 creating a trust for debt purchase and restructuring, published in La Gaceta on
December 27, 2004. Interestingly, the trust is exempted from income tax (See Law 8147, art. 9, as modified
by Law 8427).
200
See Decree 32,101-MAG (Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock), published in La Gaceta on January
12, 2005, containing the Regulation of Law 8147. See also Decree 32,677-MAG, published in La Gaceta
on October 11, 2005, modifying Decree 32,101-MAG.
201
See Legislative Decree 553 of 2001, published in the Diario Oficial of October 22, 2001, which contains
the Law of Reciprocal Guarantees System for Micro, Small and Mid-size Rural and Urban Businesses.
Chapter V creates the Trust.
202
See Legislative Decree 1215 published in the Diario Oficial of May 9, 2003, authorizing the Ministry of
Agriculture and Livestock for the creation of the “Fideicomiso PESCAR.”
203
Law 20 of 1995 creates the Fiduciary Fund for Development, amended by Law 52 published in the
Gaceta Oficial on October 21, 2004, and Law 57 published on December 22, 2004.
204
See Law 11,146 of July 26 2005, published in the Diário Oficial of July 27, 2005.

32

In these trusts, the grantor deliberately fails to designate a beneficiary. Originally,
they were considered null in English law for want of a party entitled to enforce the trust’s
terms.205 Later case law upheld the validity of purpose trusts based on the idea that – save
specific exceptions — the members of a benefited class could be identified.206
Charitable trusts are the most common type of purpose trusts. Their origin can be
traced back to Medieval England, where property held by certain religious organizations
was granted certain exemptions.207 Characteristics of charitable trusts are: (a) their
objective is the promotion of a charitable purpose;208 (b) the intervention of the
government – by means of state courts or attorneys general – in the enforcement of
charitable trusts has long been a substantial element of these instruments;209 (c) the cyprès theory applies to charitable trusts, meaning that “when the purpose indicated by the
settlor may not be attained, the court will identify the most similar purpose possible and
modify the trust instrument accordingly;”210 and (d) unlike other expressly created trusts,
charitable trusts in the United States “may last in perpetuity.”211
Other non-charitable purpose trusts are: (a) trusts for the erection or maintenance
of sepulchral monuments, graves, or tombs; (b) trusts for the saying of masses, to the
extent that they are not charitable; (c) trusts for the maintenance of particular animals; (d)
trusts for the benefit of unincorporated associations; and (e) a miscellaneous group of
trusts, such as (i) the promotion of fox-hunting; (ii) the disposal of property of the testator
for ‘best spiritual advantage’; and (iii) the provision of a maintenance fund for an historic
building.212
Charitable trusts also have been implemented in Latin America. In Argentina, for
instance, munificence trusts [fideicomisos de liberalidad] allow the donor to donate

205

Matthews, supra note 14, at 4.
Matthews, supra note 14, at 4 (“The basic rule is that trusts created for abstract or impersonal purposes
are void as there is no beneficiary to enforce the terms against the trustee, provided that the purpose is not
charitable.”); see also Frost, supra note 36, at 26.
207
David Villar Patton, The Queen, the Attorney General, and the Modern Charitable Fiduciary: A
Historical Perspective on Charitable Enforcement Reform, 11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 131, 2 (2000)
(“Because of this, feudal lords were denied the usual benefits of property once religious corporations
obtained land through charitable gifts [...] [T]o defeat these mortmain and forfeiture statutes, religious
charities quickly found a loophole by which property was conveyed to individuals for use by a religious
order.”).
208
There is extensive case law as to what the specific definition of a charitable purpose is, but courts
generally have approached the issue on a case-by-case basis. See Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 3
(“Throughout its history, the trust has furthered social justice by providing for the needs of people who are
subject to the harsh dictates of the law.”); see also Lupoi, supra note 1, at 127 (“In an opinion of Lord
Macnaghten in a decision from 1891, four categories of purpose trusts were listed: relief of poverty,
advancement of education, advancement of religion and other purposes beneficial to the community.”).
209
See Villar Patton, supra note 207, at 3 (Noting that Chancery courts in England enforced charitable
trusts “as early as the 1400s”; see also holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Vidal v. Girard 43 U.S. (2
How.) 127 (1844), quoted in Villar Patton, id., at 11-12.
210
Lupoi, supra note 1, at 130.
211
Halbach, supra note 48, at 131.
212
Matthews, supra note 14, at 5.
206
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specific assets or values during his lifetime to the beneficiary.213 Beneficence trusts
[fideicomisos de beneficencia] are used to organize somebody’s contributions for public
benefit works.214 It is not clear whether the income generated from these contributions is
tax-deductible,215 but this characteristic may operate as a disincentive for the widespread
use of munificence trusts use in Argentina.
3.2. Asset-protection or Protective trusts
These trusts allow for the settlor to shield his assets from any creditors’ claims by
expressly prohibiting their transfer, either voluntarily or by statute.216 The most common
category of protective trusts is that of “spendthrift trusts,” which impede the beneficiary
from transferring trusts interests and limit his ability to receive income from the trust.217
The asset protection benefit is lost when the settlor acts fraudulently against his
creditors218 and, in some jurisdictions, when the creditor is “a bona fide purchaser of a
legal security interest for value without notice of the trust.”219
Asset-protection trusts are rarely available in Latin America. One exceptional
case is that of Argentina’s Commerce Fund [Fondo de comercio] protecting family
businesses by holding family assets as a unit separately and isolated from the reach of
third parties.220
3.2.1. Offshore trusts
Also known as “’international trusts, or foreign grantor trusts, or a foreign nongrantor trusts,”221 they are defined as “trusts set in tax-haven countries or territories
which provide tax benefits for grantors and beneficiaries.”222 Foreign banks or other
private trusts companies act as trustees.223 They own shares, controlling or noncontrolling, in a company located onshore,224 causing this company to appear “on noone’s balance sheet.”225 Offshore trusts are very popular among wealthy persons in the
United States, who use them “to remove some of their assets from the U.S. litigation
system, to permit the trust assets to be invested in foreign funds closed to U.S. citizens

213
See Hayzus, supra note 65, at 88 (“They are gifts of particular goods that the fiduciary gives during his
lifetime […] through the periodic distribution of a sum of money or the conveyance of specific assets for
the compliance of the stipulated condition (e.i. for having reached majority).”) (translation by author).
214
Id., at 89.
215
Id., at 90.
216
Lupoi, supra note 1, at 133.
217
Halbach, supra note 80, at 215.
218
Matthews, supra note 14, at 19.
219
Hayton, supra note 72, at 154.
220
Hayzus, supra note 65, at 70. There is a real transfer of resources to the fideicomiso in this case. Id., at
71.
221
Frost, supra note 36, at 128.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Matthews, supra note 14, at 20.
225
Id. at 22.

34

Deleted: ,
Deleted: ,

Deleted: ,

Deleted: .

Deleted: ,

and resident aliens and for tax and estate planning purposes.”226 Nowadays, “offshore
trusts are the largest number of trusts created for the carrying out of business in the
international arena.” 227
3.2.2. Limited Partnership
Protective trusts have only one general partner and one limited partner who “can
have a trust hold the ninety-nine percent partnership interest … [and also have] an
interest as a general partner, this making it even more difficult for a creditor someday to
get.”228
Other alternatives for the isolation of trust assets from creditors are also
available.229
Both offshore and other protective trusts have stirred debate in the United States
in recent decades. Legal and ethical considerations have been argued against and in favor
of these types of trusts, and this debate is far from over.230

226

J. Richard Duke, Use of Trusts by US Citizens in International Tax Planning, in TRUSTS IN PRIME
JURISDICTIONS, 127 (Alon Kaplan, ed., 2000).
227
Frost, supra note 36, at 128.
228
See Barry Engel, opinion in Symposium on The Rise of the International Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 779, 3 (1999), at 3.
229
See Gideon Rothschild, opinion in Symposium on The Rise of the International Trust, 32 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 779, 18-9 (1999) (“We may set up a partnership, for example, where the client, who is the
general partner of his partnership, transfers a million dollars into the entity. He would retain a one percent
interest. A ninety-nine percent interest in that partnership then would be assigned immediately to his
foreign trust, appointing a foreign trustee as the trustee of that trust. And in that fashion, divesting himself,
for all intents and purposes, of ninety-nine percent of the equity in that partnership. Any representations to
a lender in future financial statements would only reflect that he owns a one percent interest in that
structure with his trust owning now a ninety-nine percent interest. He can be a discretionary beneficiary of
that trust, if he wishes, assuming that the jurisdiction designated allows him to remain a beneficiary of that
trust. His spouse, if he is married, and his children may also be discretionary beneficiaries of that trust, as
well as charities and any other individuals he would like to favor, either during his lifetime or upon his
death. And this trust would also serve the purpose of being his primary dispositive instrument for estate
planning purposes. It would contain, just like his will, his credit shelter provisions, his marital trust
provisions, and his generation-skipping trust provisions, and the trust would become, in effect, his will
substitute.”).
230
Among those on the pro-offshore trusts, see Rothschild, supra note 229, at 3 (noting that, “there should
be nothing wrong with an individual who wishes to protect his assets by using a trust.”); see also
Rothschild, at 17 (“There’s nothing wrong either morally, ethically, or legally with structuring the trust at
the correct moment in time when there are no foreseeable creditors on the horizon. This is no different than
any other pre-bankruptcy planning that debtors’ attorneys very often recommend.”). See also Rothschild, at
21 (warning about the consequences of the widespread use of offshore trusts: “the real reason Alaska
passed their legislation, and then Delaware copied them [was] because they saw the flight of money leaving
this country for offshore places.”). On the opposite end, some scholars hold a gloomy view about the
consequences of the “rife use of offshore trusts.” See, e.g., Eric Henzy, supra note 229 (stating that, “from
a societal perspective, […] these asset protection trusts are a bad thing” because they destroy the basic
principle that “when you do something wrong, you have to pay for it.”). See also Mary Daly, supra note
229 (Noting that in light of the fraudulent purposes for which offshore trusts are usually utilized, “…for the
most part, we're hearing about ordinary people who have accumulated an unusual amount of wealth” [and
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3.3. Securitization trusts
In an asset securitization:
a business corporation forms a private trust and transfers to that trust title
to some subset of the corporation's assets [….] [T]he trust in turn issues
bonds that are backed by those assets and pays the proceeds of the bond
sale to the corporation. Thus, the trust is used as an intermediary in a
transaction in which a corporation, in effect, pledges some of its assets as
security to back an issue of marketable bonds.231
Securitization trusts are beneficial because they enable “a complex group of
assets to be disposed of to a trustee to be available as security to investors,”232 bringing
about lower transactional costs and bankruptcy protection benefits for the trust assets.233
Several Latin American countries234 recently have passed laws dealing with
securitization. In Guatemala, for example, according to the Law on Trust Operations by
Insurance Companies of 1991,235 these companies may promote trust operations in any
banking or financial institution through the issuance of guaranteed securities of life
insurance policies with prior authorization from the Superintendence of Banks.236
Insurance companies act as fideicomitentes and perform transferences of funds to the trust
on behalf of their insured clients.237 Trust funds originate in loans provided by insurance
companies guaranteed by insurance policies, based on the securities being guaranteed by
the respective life insurance policies.238
Argentina also possesses broad experience with credit securitization [titulización
de créditos], a tool used to open access to capital markets for the promotion of house
financing.239 Here the fiduciante [mortagor/creditor] assigns its rights to an entity legally
enabled to act as financial fiduciario. The assignment may occur at the moment when a
loan is made in the same mortgage deed and it is registered directly under the fiduciary’s
what is striking is that] “they're trying to isolate themselves in a very particular way from the rest of
society.”).
231
Hansmann, supra note 11, at 18.
232
Hayton, supra note 72, at 165.
233
For example, in the case of the securitization of credit card receivables, the bank, “[called the originator
or packager], buys the credit card receivables as before, but then transfers them in trust to a separate
trustee… [and]… [S]hares in that trust are sold to various participating investors who […] are not lenders
to the bank but share owners in the trust.” See Langbein, supra note 174, at 177.
234
Chile, Colombia, Peru. See Claire A. Hill, Latin American Securitization: The Case of the Disappearing
Political Risk, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 293, 14 (1998).
235
Governmental Accord 637-91 of 1991, published in the Diario de Centro América on 2 October 1991,
approves the Regulations for the Promotion and Development of Trust Operations by Insurance
Companies.
236
Id. art. 1.
237
Id. art. 2.
238
Id. art. 6.
239
Hayzus, supra note 65, at 117.
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name. Thus, the borrower may borrow against the fideicomiso,240 which may then issue
Certificates of Participation in the fiduciary ownership,241 and the certificates are titles to
the debt generated. This method for obtaining secondary financing is called titulización
and has been used in different areas of the Argentinean economy such as financial
fideicomisos over the money owed in the purchase of flight tickets, domestic appliances,
and credit card debts;242 and for the special system established by Law 25,798, which
created a trust for the implementation of the mortgage refinancing system.243
Brazil’s Law 9,514 of 1997 introduced the Real Estate Finance System. This Law
regulates the securitization of real estate loans where the credits are expressly linked to
the issuance of titles of credit. Securitization firms are empowered to issue certificates of
real estate receivables, whereby the fiduciary agent is a financial institution expressly
authorized to that effect.244
3.4. Land trusts
These trusts are “local, state, regional, and national nonprofit organizations that
actively work to conserve land for the public benefit through a variety of means,
including, most commonly, the acquisition of land and conservation easements by gift,
purchase, or bargain purchase.”245 Through them, a private landowner “donates a
conservation easement to a land trust for one or more of the conservation purposes
enumerated in the statute generally will be entitled to a charitable income tax deduction
equal to the value of the donated easement.”246
Business trusts [fideicomisos de negocios] are used extensively in Argentina for
different purposes. Real estate trusts, for example, are roughly an equivalent to the U.S.
real estate investment trust and are comprised of a collection of different stakeholders –
the landowner, developers, planners, project coordinators, financiers, and the fiduciary –
who stands at the center of the venture – for the planning, development, construction, and
commercialization of housing.247 The fiduciary is charged with selling the units and holds
fiduciary title to the land, the buildings built thereon, the materials used for the
construction, and the funds used during the project.248 The “Gas Trust” approved by Law

240

Hayzus, supra note 65, at 118.
Id., at 46, quoting art. 21 of law 24,441 (“[T]he certificates of participation shall be issued by the
trustee. The debt securities backed by trust assets may be issued by the trustee or by third parties, as the
case may be. The certificates of participation and the debt securities can be in bearer form, or registered,
whether endorsable or not, or in book-entry form...”) (translation by Hayzus).
242
Id. at 119-120.
243
See Law 25,798 published in the Boletín Oficial of November 7, 2003.
244
See Law 9,514 of November 20, 1997, published in the Diário Oficial of November 21, 1997.
245
Nancy A. McLaughlin, The Role of Land Trusts in Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands, 38
IDAHO L. REV. 453, 1-2 (2002).
246
Id. at 1-2.
247
See Hayzus, supra note 65, at 109.
248
Id. at 109-110.
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24,076, which created the Fiduciary Investment Fund for the transportation and
distribution of gas, is another example of a business trust in Argentina.249
4. The Case of the Financial Trust
Financial trusts are a fundamental element for the organization of investment and
the administration of wealth in the United States. Among the many benefits of using
trusts for financial purposes are: bankruptcy and tax protection, the protective regime of
fiduciary law, lower costs, and easier governance.250 Commenting on the parallel
between trusts and corporations, an author has stated that even though they resemble “in
supplying for the particular venture a highly adaptable, contract-like regime of rights, of
fiduciary duties, and of internal governance, the trust offers investors an insolvency
regime superior to that of corporate law, packaged in a way that facilitates pass-through
taxation.”251
Three specific types of financial trusts deserve particular attention: trusts for
financial operations, mortgage trusts, and blind trusts.
4.1. Trusts for financial operations
Pension funds, also called “investment trusts,” are one of the best-known
categories among Anglo-American trusts for financial operations. A pension fund is “a
pool of assets that is accumulated as a reserve with which to pay the pensions of
employees at a given firm, and that is both funded and managed by the corporation whose
employees are covered by the fund.”252 The trust corpus is formed by the pension
funds.253
There are examples of this type of trust in Latin America. Argentina’s Financial
Trusts [fideicomisos financieros]254 are composed of public certificates issued by the state
and purchased in public offerings. Another expression of these trusts are funds built as
trusts by retirement and pension fund administrators, which, in turn, are authorized to

249
The Fund issues fiduciary stocks and participation certificates to raise financing. See article 2 § b) of
Law 24,076 of 1992 on the Regulation of the Transportation and Distribution of Natural Gas. See also
Letter of Intent implementing the Fund published in the Boletín Oficial of November 29, 2004. See also
article 12 of Law 26,028 of 1995, which created the Trust on the Transportation Infrastructure System.
250
See Langbein, supra note 174, at 169. (“[W]ell over 90 percent of the money held in trust in the US is in
commercial trusts as opposed to personal trusts.”).
251
Id., at 194.
252
Id., at 17.
253
Id. Pension fund trustees contract with expert investment or insurance companies to manage the trust
corpus.
254
For further analysis of the Argentinean financial trust, see also “Algunos Lineamientos Generales del
Fideicomiso de la Ley 24.441,” [“Some General Guidelines of the Trust established in Law 24,441”]
(translation by author), by Luis Moisset et al. (Available at
http://www.acader.unc.edu.ar/artallgunoslineamientosgeneralesdelfideicomiso.pdf (last visited April 25,
2006)).
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invest in these types of trusts. Nevertheless, these investment tools are affected by heavy
limitations in the amounts than can be invested.255
In Colombia, Decree 1730 of 1991, which contains the New Statute on the
Financial System, authorizes the creation of fiduciary companies. These companies are
specifically empowered to act as trustees for mortgage operation or bond issued by any
domestic or foreign firm.256 Decree 1730 also establishes the “Investment Trust,” which
is defined as “a fiduciary business undertaken by fiduciary companies with their clients,
for the benefit of the latter or of third parties appointed by them, with the principal
objective or the contemplation of the possibility of, investing or placing sums of money,
according to the instructions provided by the client.”257 Fiduciary companies are entitled
to the fee established in the fiduciary contract executed with the beneficiaries and may
issue bonds on behalf of a pool of companies.258
The Stock Market Law passed by Ecuador in 1998259 amended the Commercial
Code of 1857 introducing the Fideicomiso Mercantil [Commerce Trust]. According to
this law, only banks, authorized financial companies, and investment fund management
companies can act as fiduciaries.260
In Mexico’s case, the General Law of Credit Institutions and Banking
Establishments of 1926261 regulated fideicomisos with the peculiarity that all trusts were
considered commercial acts.262 Later in 1932, the country undertook a revision of its
commercial code with the idea of a “‘dedicated fund,”263 and the General Law on
Negotiable Instruments and Money Operations of 1932 was passed. This Law amended
255

See Law 24,241 article 74 § j), approved by Decree No. 1518/94, and modified by Decree No. 163/01.
See also, Instruction No. 19/2001, issued by the Superintendence of Retirement and Pension Funds
Administrators, published in the Boletín Oficial of August 7, 2001.
256
See Decree 1730 of April 7, 1991, published in the Diario Oficial of August 31, 1989, art. 2.1.3.1.1.
§(c).
257
Id. (translation by author).
258
See Decree 1730 of April 7, 1991, published in the Diario Oficial of August 31, 1989, art. 2.1.3.1.19;
Decree 1730, art. 2.4.11.1.1, expressly authorized the state-owned “Fiduciary Company La Previsora”
(created by Decree 1547 of 1984) to operate as a fiduciary for the management of the National Fund of
Calamities.
259
Stock Market Law, Law No. 107, was published in the Registro Oficial on July 23, 1998. See the
General Regulation of the Stock Market Law contained in Decree 390 of December 8, 1998, was published
in the Registro Oficial on December 14, 1998.
260
For example, Accord No. 20020057 issued by the Ministry of Tourism, published in the Registro Oficial
on September 25, 2002, contains the General Regulations for the Operations of the Mix Fund of Touristic
Promotion created in the Commerce Trust memorialized in the public deed executed by that Ministry on
July 29, 2002. According to the General Regulations, “La Fiduciaria” [or “The Fiduciary,” the trustee in
Anglo-American terminology] established in the public deed, administers the Fund. The funds collected in
the Trust can only be used for the promotion of products, programs, projects or touristic services qualified
as a priority by the Council of Touristic Promotion (article 63).
261
See Corrales, supra note 66, at 3.
262
Id.
263
See Waters, supra note 3, at 628 (This idea “was first coined by French advocate of the trust, Pierre
Lepaulle, whose writings were instrumental in 1932 in Mexico adopting the idea in its code revision of that
year.”).
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the commercial code, introducing a new right into the legal system called titularidad.264
Currently, the fideicomiso is used broadly for financial operations and in some cases in
real estate investments.265
Paraguay’s Law 92 of 1996 on Fiduciary Businesses (Negocios Fiduciarios),
establishes the procedure for the registration of securities issued through public offerings
in the Stock Market.266
Peru’s banking law of 1993 instituted the trust commission [comisión de
confianza], defining it as a commercial act that only banking institutions may carry
out.267 The trust issues Certificates of Participation, which are held under the name of the
fideicomisario.268 The Regulation to this Law269 created three types of fideicomisos: (a)
Fideicomisos in guarantee, where the assets are destined to guarantee the performance of
an obligation, and where the fideicomisario is the creditor;270 (b) the Testamentary
Fideicomiso;271 and (c) the Fideicomiso de Titulización272 — a type of financial trust.
The 2003 Trust Law of Uruguay273 regulates the financial trust, defined as “that
where the beneficiaries are entitled to certificates of participation in the fiduciary
ownership, of securities representative of debt guaranteed by the assets composing the
trust, or of mixed securities granting credit rights and participatory rights over the
remainder.”274 Only financial entities or administrators of investment funds may act as
financial fiduciaries.275
Finally, in 1956 Venezuela sought to “introduce a notion of trust with no
restrictions as to its range of applications.”276 The civil code fideicomiso continued to
exist, but the 1956 law permitted banks, insurance companies, and financial companies
only to perform as fiduciaries for certain banking, insurance, and other financial
operations, respectively.277
These are certain modern versions of the fideicomiso that lean towards acquiring
the main characteristics of the Anglo-American trust. They, nevertheless, fall short from
264

Lupoi, supra note 1, at 285 (“Ley General de Títulos y Operaciones de Dinero, of August 27, 1932 is a
part of the Commercial Code.”).
265
Lupoi, supra note 1, at 285 (“Ley General de Títulos y Operaciones de Dinero, of August 27, 1932 is a
part of the Commercial Code.”).
266
Law 92/96 on Fiduciary Businesses (Negocios Fiduciarios), is regulated by Resolution 854 published in
the Gaceta Oficial on June 15, 2005.
267
See supra note 18.
268
Id., art. 7.
269
See supra note 18.
270
Id., arts. 15-6.
271
Id., arts. 17-8.
272
Id., arts. 19-21.
273
See supra note 70.
274
Id. art. 25, paragraph 1.
275
Id. art. 26, paragraph 1.
276
Lupoi, supra note 1, at 291.
277
Id.
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fully incorporating the proven benefits of the common law financial trust, mainly broad
tax benefits and others already discussed.278
4.2. Mortgage trusts
These trusts are a useful mechanism for real estate financing. In them, the
lender/seller sells the property (trust property) to the borrower/buyer. Title to the property
is retained by the lender/seller who becomes the trustee for the duration of the trust, and
the borrower/buyer becomes the beneficiary enjoying the use of the property. The trust
terminates upon full payment of the debt by the borrower/buyer who becomes the full
owner of the property. Without these trusts, it would be impossible to explain the
expansion of the U.S. housing market after World War II.279
In Latin America, by contrast, the mortgage trust is a largely underused
institution. Some instances are, however, worth mentioning. Argentina’s collateral trusts
[fideicomisos de garantía] usually operate in mortgage operations by the transference of
the legal title for property from the debtor (borrower) to the lender (usually a bank or
other financial institution).280 This mechanism allows the borrower to obtain financing
and the lender to simultaneously secure a strong guarantee for the re-payment of the loan.
Trusts have played a role in the Mexican real estate sector as well. In effect, due to the
many restrictions imposed after the Mexican Revolution of 1910, investment in real
estate trusts and the participation of foreign investors have been particularly controversial
topics in that country. A Presidential Agreement of 1971 was the first government
regulation allowing the participation of foreign investors in real estate trusts over
Mexican lands. According to this regulation, only “duly certified Mexican financial
institutions [are permitted] to acquire title to real property as trustee in the name of the
beneficiary foreign investor.”281 Foreign beneficiaries only “acquired beneficiary rights to
use and profit from the real property without constituting ownership rights.”282 Later on,
mirroring the effect of world changes and in order to raise additional capital for
infrastructure development, the Foreign Investment Law of 1993 broadened authorization
for the use of real property trusts controlled by foreign investors in Mexico.283 Other
restrictions to real estate trusts include the requirement that the trustee be a Mexican284
financial institution “duly authorized by the federal government.”285
278

See Part I, pp. 15 et seq.
See generally Rothschild, supra note 229. See also supra note 50.
280
See Hayzus, supra note 65, at 113-4 (“…there is an improvement here over the classical collateral forms
available (mortgage and pledge with registration) in that the debtor relinquishes part of his assets.”)
(translation by author).
281
See Corrales, supra note 66, at 4.
282
Id.
283
Id. at 5 (“After 1993, the lifting of prior restrictions allowed foreign investors to participate in real estate
trusts for the acquisition of the “rights to the use and profits from real property located along the border and
coastline of Mexico by means of the irrevocable trust [which] had to be commercial or industrial in nature
and no ownership rights were acquired.”). These trusts allow the trustee to issue securities called Ordinary
Participation Certificates. Chapman Poindexter, supra note 7, at 5 (“Certificados de Participación
Ordinaria.”).
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Id. at 3.
285
Id. at 2.
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4.3. Blind trusts
These trusts are designed to avoid conflicts of interest for persons holding
government positions or otherwise dealing with the government in influential posts. In
this kind of trust, “the manager-trustee is prohibited from communicating with the
interested party regarding the investments made, and the interested party may not request
any information directly from the trustee.”286 There are several Latin American
experiences with this type of trust.287
PART IV: The Road Ahead: Looking Beyond the Current Paradigm
1. In general
As already stated, in today’s globalized world of business, finances, and
exchanges, the Latin American region has long been familiar with Anglo-American
trusts,288 and it is likely that attempts at deepening this familiarity will continue to take
place “if only to capture back some of the lucrative international financial work which
has gone to common law jurisdictions.”289 A commentator has noted that civil law
scholars feel jealous “when they visit the universities, hospitals, and other general social
institutions [in Great Britain and the United States] [and see them] prospering because of
the [trust] mechanism.”290 Therefore, the need for an expansion of trusts as business and
financial tools is more present than ever.
The discussion about the compatibility or equivalence – or the lack thereof –
between the trust and the fideicomiso is not just for academicians, but is a practical matter
in the international business world. The problem arises particularly in two situations:
when a trust created in a common law country seeks recognition in a civil law
jurisdiction291 and when a trust created pursuant to a statute in a civil law jurisdiction
searches to be recognized in another “jurisdiction [which] has adopted a form of trust by
statute.”292
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Albisinni, supra note 87, at 591.
For a recent discussion on the blind trust [fideicomiso ciego] see the case of Chile: available at
http://www.senado.cl/prontus_senado/antialone.html?page=http://www.senado.cl/prontus_senado/site/artic/
20050602/pags/20050602182005.html (last visited Dec. 2006).
288
See Gaillard supra note 33, at 313 (“… the civil-law countries find themselves more and more
frequently confronted with international situations involving trusts.”).
289
Matthews, supra note 14, at 22.
290
Mayda, supra note 101, at 7 (“One may be allowed to ask whether it is really the legal technique of
trusts or rather the greater availability of money […] which makes the difference.”).
291
See generally Walter H. Diamond et al., INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS AND ANALYSIS (2001).
292
Adair Dyer, Topic V: The Recognition of Common Law Trusts and Their Adoptions in Civil Law
Societies, in Symposium International Recognition and Adaptation of Trusts: The Influence of the Hague
Convention, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 989, 3 (1999), at 10.
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Globalization increasingly will require the need for mutual recognition of trusts
created in both legal systems. The construction of a more modern or business-friendly
version of the Latin American fideicomiso seems to be the starting point.293
Reality shows that most civil law countries have and continue to adopt “trust-like
institutions.”294 Despite the apparent irreconcilable stands of common and civil law,295
there are academic examples of how an approach between the trust in both systems would
occur. In fact, an author has modeled a process of “reception” of a foreign legal
institution, which could help to develop a working hypothesis for the reception of AngloAmerican trusts in Latin American countries.296
The “reception” in the proposed model would not happen overnight, but in stages.
First, “the arrival of the foreign doctrine,297 which is the trust doctrine in this exercise.
Second, the reaction could range from rejection, acceptance, or acceptance followed by
repentance.298 Thirdly, “assimilation with the underlying law,”299 coupled with
subsequent positive experiences for the users of the initially foreign doctrine. The last
stage is the reconstruction of the doctrine and its full reconciliation with domestic
institutions and practices.300
This process of “reception” or incorporation would entail obstacles and potential
misunderstandings. The change is a particularly daunting task when it comes to “the

293

Latin American courts do not enjoy the breath of equitable powers that Anglo-American courts do and,
therefore, the quest for resulting and constructive trusts has to necessarily focus on statutory law. In this
context, the obligation to restitute the trust assets or the values or income generated thereof –which is
germane to the resulting trust—is also present in several Latin American legal institutions. In effect,
statutory law in Latin America generally provides that if the grantor gratuitously conveys property to the
donee and the transfer fails due to the noncompliance with any of the legal formalities necessary to perfect
the transfer, in this case, the third party who receives the trust property is under the obligation to restitute it
to the intended beneficiary. With respect to resulting trusts, the same effect may roughly be obtained
through the Latin American doctrine of simulation. See COD. CIV. art. 989 (Argentina, 1917).
(“Simulation is present when the juridical character of an act in concealed under the appearance of another
act, or when the act contains clauses which are not sincere, or dates which are not true, or when rights are
constituted or transferred thereby to interposed persons, other than those for whom they are really
constituted or to whom they are transferred.”). These legal actions take the form of legal actions aimed at
annulling the effects of the unlawful act. Id. art. 1078 (“Juridical acts are void when the parties have
proceeded with simulation …”) (translation by author). What remains to be determined is whether Latin
American courts could imposed a resulting trust in the absence of statutory authority.
294
Hansmann, supra note 11, at 2.
295
Venturatos, supra note 16, at 1 ("Incorporating a common law concept into a jurisdiction of the civil law
jurisdiction tradition presents many difficulties, not only in terminology, but in basic underlying legal
concepts.").
296
Kenneth G.C. Reid, The Idea of Mixed Legal Systems, in First Worldwide Congress on Mixed
Jurisdictions Salience and Unity in the Mixed Jurisdiction Experience: Traits, Patterns, Culture,
Commonalities, 78 TUL. L. REV. 5, 9-10 (2003). (“The trust fits the model neatly enough.”).
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Id. at 9-10.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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adaptation of legal institutions that is necessary in order to recognize trusts created under
foreign law.”301
2. Potential Avenues for the Expansion of Business and Financial Trusts in Latin
America
There are several alternatives of Anglo-American business trusts that do not exist
in Latin America, which, if created, could serve as an important investment tool in the
region. These options are listed below.
2.1. Flee clauses or “grasshopper” trusts: In these trusts, the trustees and the law
governing the trust are substituted for other trustees and for the law of a new jurisdiction
“when any of a broad range of specified events occur.”302
2.2. “Blackhole” trusts: These conveyance devices are meant to distribute income for a
period of a hundred years to the beneficiaries, “upon the expiry of which the capital is to
be distributed to the youngest then living descendant of [the grantor] born after 82 years
have elapsed from creation of the trust.”303
2.3. Unit trusts: These are “a collective investment vehicle in which the value of units in
the trust held for a unit-holder is directly related to the value of the assets held by the unit
trustee.”304
2.4. Custodian trusts: A corporation custodian holds the securities for a broker, who
holds them for a client. Custodian trusts are practical tools fostering a “speedy
inexpensive dealing in stocks and shares.”305
2.5. Debenture trusts: In this complex class of trusts, “a trustee can hold on trust for the
lenders the borrower’s covenant to repay, together with property charged to the trustee as
a security for the loan.”306
2.6. Subordination trusts: Subordination “is a transaction whereby one creditor, the
‘subordinated’ or ‘junior’ creditor, agrees not to be paid by a debtor until another
creditor, the ‘senior creditor,’ of the common debtor has been paid.”307
2.7. Retention trust funds: Used in the building industry, they provide the security to the
employer that the “project is properly completed, while the management contractor and
work contractors are protected in the event of the insolvency of the employer.”308
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Dyer, supra note 292, at 17.
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2.8. Trust proceeds clause: This trust operates as a guarantee for the wholesaler vis-à-vis
the retailer.309
2.9. Client account trusts: These are used by professional services providers to isolate
and protect their clients’ property from third parties.310
2.10. Voting trusts: In voting trusts, shareholders place shares into a trust and appoint a
trustee. Shareholders instruct the trustee, who generally “enjoy[s] little or no
discretion,”311 how to vote in these type of trusts.
2.11. Trust receipt: A trust receipt has been explained as follows:
[I]t may happen that a borrower needs to retain physical possession of the
property on which he has been granted credit by a bank or wholesaler in
order to be able to make advantageous sales of finished products or to be
able to manufacture raw materials into salable property. A pledge
therefore would be out of the question, and the bank may not feel that the
customer is good for an unsecured loan. The creditor therefore allows the
property to remain in the possession of the borrower but will require him
to give a trust receipt evidencing he holds the property as ‘trustee’ for the
bank, and that the proceeds of sale belong to the bank. In case of the
borrower’s bankruptcy the bank has a prior claim on the property; if the
loan were unsecured, it would have to share with other creditors.312
2.12. Other: Real estate investment trusts and oil and gas royalty trusts are expressions
of business trusts broadly used in the Anglo-American world.313
This long list of statutory trusts reflects the extensive expressions available for the
Anglo-American trust. Needless to say, the Latin American fideicomiso presents an
alarming shortage of possibilities vis-a vis the Anglo-American trust and, at the same
time, suggests the breath of opportunities for modernization.
3. The Multilateral Approach
A crucial battle for the relation between the civil law fideicomiso and the AngloAmerican trust took place at the conference leading to the adoption of the Hague
Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition (Convention) to
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See Waters supra note 3, at 607 (“[u]pon transfer of possession to the retailer the trustee holds title to
goods, the proceeds clause gives the unpaid wholesaler an immediate absolute equitable interest in the
proceeds upon authorized sale of the goods by the retailer. In this way the wholesaler retains his interest as
against the floating charge of the retailer’s lending bank, and against the retailer’s bondholders. The
property is never in the retailer.”).
310
Hayton, supra note 72, at 166.
311
Hansmann, supra note 11, at 17.
312
Golbert, supra note 6, at 74.
313
Langbein, supra note 174, at 175-6.
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which several Latin American countries are party to.314 The Convention has been
described by a leading international trust law scholar “as the first serious attempt in 600
years to bridge the gap of the “English” Channel […] in the field of fiduciary law.”315
The scholar was referring to the Convention’s efforts “to furnish judges and practitioners
[in both civil and common law jurisdictions] with the elements that would allow them to
understand this legal institution more clearly.”316
The purpose of the conference was “not to introduce the trust into the civil law
countries”317 but to “validate the activities of common-law trustees in civilian
systems.”318 The results were mixed and, as a trust expert has pointed out, the conference
was the stage for “few convergences and far many misunderstandings.”319
3.1. A Compromised Definition of the trust
The conference’s purported goal was to find a definition valid for civil and
common law systems. In fact, the Convention establishes that the term ‘trust’ refers to
“the legal relationships created –inter vivos or on death– by a person, the settlor, when
assets have been placed under the control of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or
for a specified purpose.”320 The same provision outlines the features of the trust: (a) the
assets constitute a separate fund and are not a part of the trustee's own estate; (b) title to
the trust’s assets stands in the name of the trustee or in the name of another person on
behalf of the trustee; and (c) the trustee has the power and the duty, under which he is
held accountable, to manage, employ or dispose of the assets in accordance with the
trust’s terms and the special duties imposed upon him by law.
Several problems arose immediately from this “shapeless” definition.321 First, the
term “trust” is not reserved in Anglo-American systems exclusively to expressly created
trusts. Even though resulting and constructive trusts do not require a specific act by the
trustor, these are still fully regarded as trusts. The Convention’s definition completely
obliterates the possibility of equitable trusts being recognized outside the common law
world. Second, the definition states that the assets are not a part of the trustee's own
estate. The Latin American fideicomiso, as already mentioned, establishes that if the
trustee dies before the condition fails or a term expires for the transfer of the trust assets,
these become a part of the trustee’s own estate. This feature shows a dichotomy with the
Anglo-American trust, in that in the Latin American fideicomiso, the fiduciario is the full
owner of the corpus and, as such, the corpus becomes a part of his estate at his death.
This effect is unthinkable in common law. Thirdly, in Latin American civil systems, the
trustee holds both legal and equitable title to the assets, not just legal title as seen in
314

Latin American member states are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,
and Venezuela.
315
Waters, quoted in Dyer, supra note 292, at 3.
316
Dyer, supra note 292, at 15.
317
Id. at 15.
318
Lupoi, supra note 1, at 345.
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Id. at 327.
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Convention, art. 2.
321
As a consequence, a ‘shapeless trust’ “was ultimately recognized.” Lupoi, supra note 1, at 332.
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common law. The definition fails to endorse this essential element of Anglo-American
trusts. Lastly, whereas in common law a trustee may be also a beneficiary, this scenario is
generally unacceptable in civil law systems, where a person is either a trustee or a
beneficiary, but not simultaneously. The definition contains a rather anodyne reference to
this circumstance when it states that “the fact that the trustee may himself have rights as a
beneficiary, are not necessarily inconsistent with the existence of a trust.” But this
statement of compromise does not alter the essential difference between the AngloAmerican and the Latin American trust when it comes to the trustee’s powers. In sum, the
rules contained in the definition only postpone legal debates instead of clarifying them at
once.
It follows that the Convention’s definition of trusts is so flawed that the only valid
explanation for its issuance is that it was conceived – in the words of a recognized
international trust law expert — as “an image that caters to the need for judges and
lawyers in non-trust countries to be able to identify trust-like devices operationally from
their specific characteristics, rather than having to view them as a whole and try to fit
them within a comprehensive definition.”322
3.2. The Limited Scope of the Convention’s application
The Convention states it applies exclusively to “trusts created voluntarily and
evidenced in writing.”323 A commentator has noted that
this provision is intended to limit the scope of the application of the
Convention to clear and unambiguous trust relationships and to release the
judge in civil law countries from the difficult task of dealing with more
complicated forms of common law trusts, in particular with constructive
trusts and the trusts which are established by a court order.324
In the light of this provision, if an Anglo-American constructive trust seeks
recognition in Latin America, a Latin American judge will probably not recognize it
based on the principle that recognition is a matter of domestic legislation that cannot be
trumped by international treaties. If, however, a foreign judge has established the trust, it
is a matter of enforcing a foreign judgment. Therefore, the establishment of common law
trusts in Latin America will always be a matter pertaining to their respective common law
jurisdictions. But their effects in civil law jurisdictions will be left to Latin American
judges to decide. The recognition of a trust – whatever its origin and the form it takes —
is an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of a civil law judge, who will recognize the
trust as long as it conforms to civil law rules. The Convention addresses this dilemma but
it does not provide a satisfactory and complete solution.
322

Dyer, supra note 292, at 7.
Convention, art. 3.
324
Hein Kotz, The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and Their Recognition, in MODERN
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TRUST LAW, 40 (David Hayton, ed., Kluwer The Hague, 1999). See
also J Schoenblum, The Hague Convention on Trusts: Much Ado About Very Little, 3 J Int. Trust & Corp
Plan 5 (1994).
323

47

3.3. The Challenge of Reaching Full Recognition of a Trust
When a foreign trust is recognized in one of the signatory jurisdictions, the
Convention forces them to accord, as a minimum, to the following effects of recognition:
(a) that the trust property constitutes a separate fund; (b) that the trustee may sue and be
sued in his capacity as trustee; (c) that the trustee may appear or act in this capacity
before a notary or any person acting in an official capacity; (d) that personal creditors of
the trustee shall have no recourse against the trust’s assets; (e) that the trust’s assets shall
not form part of the trustee's estate upon his insolvency or bankruptcy; (f) that the trust’s
assets shall not form part of the matrimonial property of the trustee or his spouse nor part
of the trustee's estate upon his death; and (g) that the trust’s assets may be recovered
when the trustee, in breach of trust, has mingled them with his own property or has
alienated them.325
As reviewed earlier, effects (d), (e), (f), and (g) are by and large excluded in Latin
American jurisdictions.
Other conflictive points worth noting in the Convention are: (a) purpose trusts are
accepted by the Convention in general, a notion conflicting with civil law, which accepts
them very restrictively; (b) with respect to the double capacity of an individual as grantor
and trustee, the Convention explicitly forbids that the trustor appoints himself as trustee;
yet Anglo-American law is entirely different and allows the settlor to appoint himself as
trustee and beneficiary at the same time; (c) in regards to the legal relationship between
settlor and trustee, the Convention characterizes this relationship as “lasting,” which is
“the very antithesis of the English-model trust,”326 where such relationship is inherently
nonexistent, save extremely circumscribed exceptions; (d) under the segregation of
assets rule, the Convention does not make a clear-cut differentiation between the legal
and equitable rights vested in the trustee, which, as already seen, is a fundamental
difference between civil and common-law trusts; and (e) in what respects are constructive
and resulting trusts – due to the supposed lack of the trustor’s voluntarily expressed will
— excluded from the Convention.
Needless to say, the Conventions provisions flagrantly overlook the fact that
common law courts often intervene to “complete the implicit intention of the settlor, not
to oppose or contravene it [thus not creating but simply declaring] its existence.”327
In spite of its good intentions to effectively address the apparent need for mutual
recognition of Anglo-American trusts and civil law fideicomisos, the Convention affords
extremely limited solutions to this conundrum.
4. The Unilateral Approach
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An alternative to the multilateral approach may come in the form of initiatives
undertaken by Latin American countries in shaping their own versions of trusts. These
proposals must be framed necessarily around civil codes.328 In fact, civil codes serve as
the basis for a “superstructure of theory [which purports to be] valid for any time or
place.”329 Common law, instead, is based on the notion that, as society changes legal
solutions need to change as well. A significant evidence of this profound dissimilitude is
shown in the relevance of stare decisis, so entrenched in common law systems and utterly
rejected by civil law countries.330 As a consequence, whereas common law has developed
a “highly sophisticated methodology for interpreting case law,”331 civil law systems count
with very specialized methodologies for statutory interpretation.332 Therefore, in general,
both systems lack the expertise in methodological interpretation enjoyed by the other.333
In this context, the differences in the nature, treatment, and legal consequences of trusts
in both legal systems need to be understood. These differences relate to the very
foundation of each legal culture, which more than often find themselves in stark
opposition.334
As trust law is a genuine common law byproduct, it can only be fully understood
within the nuts and bolts of Anglo-American legal principles. Any attempts at equalizing
Anglo-American and Latin American trust law needs to address the overarching issue of
the relationships between both legal systems. More specifically, without the idea that
courts may use equitable powers to enforce trusts, as it happens in Anglo-American legal
systems, there could never be a total identification of trust institutions in both legal
worlds, because “ melding of the two signifies a profound alteration of each.”335
Another structural obstacle to the reception of the Anglo-American trust in civil
law jurisdictions is the unitary concept of ownership, which is completely inconsistent
with the common law idea that two types of interests [or ownership rights] co-exist in
328
Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal Uniformity and the
Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, (2001), at 23 (“Civil codes have been
defined by a common law jurist as “written texts designed to govern throughout time, designed to embody
the immutably true, to embody principles so reliable that they supersede and can withstand the vicissitudes
of the particular, of the temporal, of the myriad contextual elements that connect human beings to the legal
issues they ask courts to adjudicate.”).
329
Id. at 23.
330
Id. at 22 (“Judicial creation of law in civil-law legal cultures remains the exceptional recourse…”); Id.,
at 21 (“Where the legal system contains gaps or lagoons, it is said that interpretation can be done "[b]eyond
the Civil Code but by means of the Civil Code.”).
331
Id. at 14.
332
See generally Konrad Zweigert & Hans-Jürgen Puttfarken, Statutory Interpretation-Civilian Style, in
CIVIL LAW, 259-74 (Ralf Rogowski ed., 1996); John W. Van Doren, Things Fall Apart, or Modern Legal
Mythology in the Civil Law Tradition: The Civil Law Tradition, 2 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 447, 1, 5-10, 20-3,
(1993); Jorge L. Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 55 FLA. L. REV. 41, 1-5, 17-24
(2003); and JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (2d ed. 1985), reprinted in JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN,
ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA, 192-210 (1994).
333
Grosswald Curran, supra note 328, at 15.
334
Id. at 1. (“[T]he defining characteristics of civil-law legal culture not only are largely absent from
common-law legal systems, but […] they consciously and repeatedly were rejected by England.”).
335
Id. at 36.
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common law trusts: equitable rights and legal rights.336 The Napoleonic Code decidedly
rejected this split.337
As already noted, nothing in the Anglo-American inter vivos trust resembles a
civil law contract.338 The trustee is neither an agent of the trustor or the beneficiary, nor is
the beneficiary a principal of the trustee.339 The position of the common law beneficiary
is much different in civil law jurisdictions and, as a commentator states, “it would be
doubtful, in principle, to sustain that [the beneficiary] has something more than personal
rights.”340
These apparently insurmountable challenges come at a time when a large number
of legal experts in the Americas accept that the trust tool is superior to traditional civil
law institutions for the purposes of managing assets, reducing transactional costs, and
obtaining additional benefits, such as tax benefits and the simplification of administration
procedures, among others.341
Therefore, any proposals must consider these realities and the ultimate alternative
available to fully upgrade the Latin American fideicomiso to the standards of the AngloAmerican trust and needs to come as a result of the passing of specific legislation in Latin
American jurisdictions.342
5. Advancing criteria for a reformulation and deepening of Latin American business
fideicomiso
Among the criteria that legislation should take into account are:
5.1. Contract law or property law
With respect to the old debate “as to whether the law of trusts is properly
considered a branch of contract law or of property law,”343 new attempts for the
expansion of trusts in Latin America should overcome this dogmatic question. In that
sense, pragmatic approaches should meet their hour in the region.
5.2. The concept of ownership
336

V. Bolgár, Why No Trusts in the Civil Law, 2 Am. J. Comp. L. 204, 216-17 (1953), at 210, quoted in
Sonneveldt, supra note 31, at 15.
337
See Hansmann, supra note 11, at 5 (The “trust doctrine runs counter to the so called unitary theory of
property rights. During the French revolution, divided property rights came to be considered characteristic
of feudalism.”).
338
Checa, supra note 75, at 108.
339
Id..
340
Id. at 110.
341
Id. at 18.
342
Id. (“[T]he resource to a special law is the suitable method to introduce in the ambit of a civil law
system an appropriate regulation of the Anglo-American trust.”) (translation by author).
343
Hansmann, supra note 11, at 19; for a complete analysis of the legal nature of trusts see also John H.
Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625 (1995).
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The unitary and indivisible concept of property puts a strong obstacle to the goal
of extending trusts in the region,344 but, with a practical take in the matter, and based on
already existing civil law institutions that recognize a right of partial enjoyment over an
item, this obstacle certainly could be worked out.
5.3. Registration requirements
Public registration requirements for land trusts are another important barrier to
creating an Anglo-American-type of fideicomisos in Latin America.345 In formulating
new legislation, it should not matter whether title to the property is held under the name
of the trustor or the trustee, as long as the property is a sufficient guarantee for a
transaction and there are satisfactory remedies for cases of fraud by the debtor – be it the
grantor, the trustee, or even the beneficiary.
5.4. Restrictions on encumbrances
As currently regulated, restrictions on encumbrances are another impediment for
trust expansion in Latin America.346 A result of the Napoleonic Civil Code’s legacy,
restrictions on the free alienability of rights over items are frowned at in Latin America. ,
Similarly, the trustee’s restriction from alienating (encumbering or transferring) the trust
corpus in violation of his fiduciary duties is at the heart of the Anglo-American inter
vivos trust. Therefore, the obstacle that the rule against restrictions on free alienability
poses on the expansion of trusts is minimal – reason being that these restrictions apply to
trustees both in common and civil law systems, meaning no significant differences exist
in the matter.
5.5. Formation costs
The low cost involved in the formation of a trust is one of the reasons frequently
raised to explain the wide success of trusts in the Anglo-American world. This should be
an important characteristic of a new Latin American fideicomiso, which should involve,
as one scholar proposes, “reducing the burden of drafting; reducing information costs for
various actors – lawyers, judges, and businesspeople — by inducing them to use the same
form; making it easier for actors to bond themselves credibly to certain structures or
forms of conduct; and facilitating an accretion of clarifying legal precedent.”347
5.6. The trustee
The function of trustee should be extended beyond the current status in Latin
America where oftentimes only banks and financial institutions can serve as trustees.
344

V. Bolgár, supra note 336, at 216-17. (“[I]t has been suggested that the concept of indivisible property,
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Individuals also should be allowed to serve as trustees,348 especially concerning financial
trusts. Furthermore, the fiduciary duties to which trustees are subject to also should be
revised and expanded.
5.7. Tax considerations
An appropriate tax treatment for trusts in Latin America would be the number one
factor for their expansion in the region.349 The widespread fear that trusts would become
a tool for rampant tax evasion is overly exaggerated. Panama — a country that has taken
important steps in the direction of deepening its trust institutions – shows the increased
presence of trusts does not equal unlawful activity, based on its recent relatively
successful experience with modern trusts.350 Another instance of the limited adverse tax
consequences that a trust has created in Latin America occurs in Argentina. In fact, in
1995, this country passed Law 24,441 introducing the notion of “fiduciary ownership.”
This law acknowledged the close relationship between the fideicomiso and other areas of
law, such as family law, intestate and testamentary law, property and personal rights, and
tax law.351 Despite the apparent broad availability of the Argentinean fideicomiso, it has
had limited success. The likely reason is the unresolved question about the tax treatment
of the fideicomiso.352 At the corporate level, the trust corpus is taxed in same manner as
any company’s assets.353 Inter vivos and testamentary trusts do not receive a favorable tax
treatment either, because whatever tax exemptions the grantor enjoyed are lost upon the
transfer to the fiduciarios.354 The only exception seems to be the preferential tax
treatment accorded to financial trusts.355
Finally, Panama’s trust law of 1984 includes a broad tax exemption for all
transactions related to the creation, amendment, or termination of a fideicomiso or the
conveyance, inheritance, or encumbrance of fideicomiso property. Exemptions extend to
the income generated and all other fideicomiso transactions relating to property located
abroad, cash deposited from income generated overseas by non-Panamanian sources, or
shares and securities of any type issued by firms whose income is generated overseas by
non-Panamanian sources that are deposited in Panama.356
As reviewed, these are samples of the multiple experiences Latin American
countries have in offering tax exemptions or credits for trust operations. These cases have
not generated obstacles to tax collection that did not already exist, as tax enforcement is
a real challenge for many governments due to inadequate or insufficient policies.
348
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Therefore, tax exemptions or credits for new forms of fideicomisos would not pose
exceptional hindrances to existing tax collection policies in the region and their
prospective benefits would outweigh the foreseeable risks.
5.8. Civil liability: Trusts should not be used to avoid compliance with Latin American
countries’ fundamental laws and public order regulations.357 For example, donative trusts
should not be allowed to circumvent tax, succession rules, or to “defraud creditors or to
defeat claims of divorcing spouses.”358 Absent these circumstances, they should be
allowed to survive and strive in Latin America.
5.9. Remedies: Remedial measures should be extended in Latin America, allowing the
beneficiaries and innocent third parties to enforce their rights through expeditious and
efficient means. In light of this point – as noted in books — there are not many
differences between the remedies available in common law and civil law countries; the
difference lies in the effective enforcement of those measures in civil law systems.359
Conclusion
This article has identified the main similarities and differences between the
Anglo-American trust and the Latin American fideicomiso. Special attention was given to
the core differences between both institutions, to assess the possibility of creating a truly
useful Latin American fideicomiso. For this purpose, the article reviewed existing
fideicomiso legislation in Latin America and advanced general criteria for future
proposals in this area.
The ground is fertile for changes that will bring more business opportunities for
everybody in the region. Investors, both domestic and foreign, claim and expect more
creative and innovative legal tools, welcoming more investment in the region. A new
modern version of a Latin American trust goes to the heart of these expectations. A
growing number of stakeholders think there are convincing reasons to believe the many
benefits trusts bring to different stakeholders in common law countries – whether in the
form of preferential tax treatment, as a means to avoid probate procedures, or to isolate
assets from third parties – would not also flow within the Latin American region once a
more modern form of trusts is implemented, but also from the outside.
A solution on the international level for the international recognition of trusts in
the Anglo-American and Latin American legal systems is still a strong alternative. In the
meantime, many would regard the unilateral design of a new modern Latin American
trust as a beneficial first step. The analysis and proposals contained in this article seek to
provide some guidance to that effect.
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In the absence of changes, either multilateral or unilateral – as a Harvard report
stated more than half a century ago referring to transnational trust law practitioners – as
"a possible safeguard available to the draftsman of a trust instrument [drafted in one
jurisdictions with potential effects in another] may be a provision for alternative legal
dispositions, conforming to the civil law, to insure against the effect of a possible adverse
holding."360

360

Common Law Trusts in Civil Law Courts, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1030 (1954), at 7.
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